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THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION AND THE MYTH OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, a man was convicted of rape in Jerusalem -not for forcing sex on
his victim, but for posing as a "Jewish bachelor" with a "serious romantic"
interest in her:
If [the complainant] had not thought the accused was a Jewish bachelor
interested in a serious romantic relationship, she would not have
co-operated with him....
The court is obliged to protect the public interest from sophisticated,
smooth-tongued and sweet-talking criminals who can deceive innocent
victims at an unbearable price-the sanctity of their bodies and souls.'
Even as the Kashour case was pending in Israel, a bill was pending in
Massachusetts authorizing life imprisonment for anyone who "has sexual
intercourse . . . with a person having obtained that person's consent by the use of
fraud, concealment or artifice."' In Tennessee, rape is already defined to include
"sexual penetration . . . accomplished by fraud."' A man commits rape in
Idaho, under a 2011 amendment, when he has sex with a woman who, because
of his "artifice, pretense or concealment," believes him to be "someone other
than" who he is.4 In Canada, a Supreme Court Justice has stated that rape is
1. CrimC (Jer) 561/o8 State of Israel v. Kashour (July 19, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription), para. 13, 15. The facts of the case remain disputed. Kashour denied claiming to
be Jewish, while the woman initially asserted forcible rape. See Lital Grossman, From Rape to
Racism: How and Why Did Charges Change Against Arab Man?, HAARETZ, Sept. 17,
2010, http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/from-rape-to-racism-how-and-why
-did-charges-change-against-arab-man-1 .314319. The doctrine of rape-by-deception has
been affirmed by Israel's Supreme Court in a case involving less politically charged facts. See
CrimA 2358/o6 Selimann v. State of Israel (Sept. 17, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (upholding the rape conviction of a Jewish man who pretended to be
a housing official able to procure apartments for women in exchange for sex). In 2012, the
Israeli Supreme Court reduced Kashour's sentence. CrimA 5734/10 Kashour v. State
of Israel (Jan. 25, 2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription); Joanna Paraszczuk,
Court Cuts Arab-Israeli Rape-by-Deception Sentence, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 27, 2012,
http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=255363.
2. H.R. 1494, i86th Gen. Court (Mass. 2009), http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186
/House/H1494 (emphasis added).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. 5 39-13-503(a)(4) (2010).
4. IDAHO CODE ANN. 518-6101(8) (Supp. 2011). Interestingly, if a man is so deceived, it isn't
rape. Id. §5 18-6101(7) to (8), 18-61o8.
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committed whenever sex is procured through "dishonesty."s
Thus "rape-by-deception" is a live and intensifying issue in criminal law.
The problem it poses is easy to describe. Many-perhaps most-of us don't
think "rape-by-deception" is rape at all. Neither, as a rule, do our courts. The
problem is that we ought to think it is rape, and courts ought to so hold, given
what we say rape is.
According to a very widely shared view, rape means sex without the
victim's consent. The crime was often so understood by common law judges;
it is explicitly so defined in many modern statutes;' and it is frequently so
described in contemporary usage, both lay and legal."o But sex-by-deception is
sex without consent, because a consent obtained by deception, as courts have
long and repeatedly held outside of rape law, is "no consent" at all."
s. See R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 374 (Can.) (opinion of L'Heureux-Dub6, J.).
6. See, e.g., Ryan McCartney, Could a Pick-Up Artist Be Charged with 'Rape by Deception'?, NBC
NEWS, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3843o181/ns/us-news-crimeandcourts/t/could
-pick-up-artist-be-charged-rape-deception (last updated July 27, 2010, 1:38 PM) (noting the
"visceral reaction [of] many in the United States" against the Kashour ruling).
7. See infra Section II.A; see also, e.g., B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by Fraud or
Impersonation, 91 A.L.R.2d 591, § 2 (1963) ("[T]he prevailing view is that upon proof that
consent to intercourse was given, even though [procured by] fraud . . . , a prosecution for
rape cannot be maintained.").
8. See, e.g., R v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23 at 43 (Stephen, J.) (Eng.) (" [T]he definition of
rape is having connection with a woman without her consent . . . ."); I FRANCIs WHARTON,
A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAw § 556, at 490 (8th ed. 1880) ("[I]t may now be received as
settled law that rape is proved when carnal intercourse is effected with a woman without her
consent. . . .").
9. See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2004) (defining "Sexual assault"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-503(1) (2011) (defining "Sexual intercourse without consent"); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (LexisNexis 2003); Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act, 2009, (A.S.P. 9),
§ 1; Sexual Offences Act, 2003, C. 42, 5 1(1) (U.K.).
1o. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[U]nconsented-to sex
is forcible rape, or, at the least, battery."); People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (Ct.
App. 1984) ("[T]he law of rape primarily guards the integrity of a woman's will and the
privacy of her sexuality from an act of intercourse undertaken without her consent.");
CAROLYN LOGAN, COUNTERBALANCE: GENDERED PERSPECTIVES FOR WRITING AND LANGUAGE
72 (1997) ("In public discourse, rape has become 'unconsented sexual activity."'); Joan
McGregor, Force, Consent, and the Reasonable Woman, in IN HARM'S WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF JOEL FEINBERG 231, 250 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen Buchanan eds., 1994) ("Rape should be
conceptualized as unconsented-to sexual intercourse . . . .").
ii. E.g., McClellan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 247 A.2d 58, 61 (D.C. 1968) ("[C]onsent obtained on the
basis of deception is no consent at all."); Johnson v. State, 921 So. 2d 490, 5o8 (Fla. 2005)
(per curiam) ("Consent obtained by trick or fraud is actually no consent at all . . . ."); Kreag
v. Authes, 28 N.E. 773, 774 (Ind. App. 1891) ("Consent obtained by fraud is, in law,
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A person who enters your house pretending to be a meter reader commits
trespass (entry onto real property without consent);12 a Ponzi-scheme swindler
commits larceny or theft (taking property without consent) "by deception";" a
man posing as a doctor who "lays his hands on [a woman's] person" commits
battery (offensive touching without consent)." "Fraud," as Judge Learned
Hand put it, "will vitiate consent as well as violence.""s Why, then, isn't
sex-by-deception rape?
The answer, for American courts, is that rape requires more than
equivalent to no consent."); Chatman v. Giddens, 91 So. 56, 57 (La. 1921) ("Consent
induced by fraud is no consent at all."); Farlow v. State, 265 A.2d 578, 580 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1970) ("Consent . . . obtained by fraud . . . is the same as no consent so far as trespass
is concerned."); Murphy v. I.S.K.CON of New Eng., Inc., 571 N.E.2d 34 0, 352 (Mass. 1991)
("Of course, if consent is obtained by fraud or duress, there is no consent."); Dellavecchio v.
Hicks, No. FD-o4-1o38-9o, 2oo6 WL 727770, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 23,
2006) (per curiam) ("Consent given by virtue of fraud is no consent at all."); State v. Ortiz,
584 P.2d 13o6, 1308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) ("[A] consent obtained by fraud, deceit or
pretense is no consent at all."); Lawyer v. Fritcher, 29 N.E. 267, 268 (N.Y. 1891) ("If the
plaintiffs consent was obtained by defendant through fraud, it was void, for fraud vitiates
all contracts and all consents."); People v. De Leon, 16 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1888) ("The
consent of the prosecutrix, having been procured by fraud, was as if no consent had been
given . . . ."); see also, e.g., United States v. Cavitt, 5o F. 3 d 430, 439 (5th Cit. 2008)
("'Consent' induced by an officer's misrepresentation is ineffective."); United States v.
Hardin, 539 F.3 d 404, 425 n.12 (6th Cit. 20o8) (defining a "valid consent" as
"uncontaminated by duress, coercion, or trickery" (quoting United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d
425, 429 (6th Cir. 1981))); United States v. Sheard, 473 F.2d 139, 152 (D.C. Cit. 1972)
(Wright, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, under elementary principles of law consent obtained
by misrepresentation is no consent at all."); Jeffcoat v. United States, 551 A.2d 1301, 1304 n-5
(D.C. 1988) ("To be valid, consent must be informed and not the product of trickery, fraud,
or misrepresentation.").
12. E.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cit. 2004); J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye
Servs., Ltd. v. ABC, Inc., 44 F-3 d 1345, 1352 (7 th Cit. 1995); see also Farlow, 265 A.2d at 581
(finding entry trespassory where entry was procured through fraud); Ortiz, 584 P.2d at 1308
("Where the consent to enter is obtained by fraud, deceit or pretense, the entry is
trespassory because the entry is based on a false consent."); RoLnN M. PERKINS, PERKINS ON
CRIMINAL LAw 245-48 (2d ed. 1969).
13. Elliott v. State, No. 05-10-00049-CR, 2011 WL 2207091, at *1 (Tex. App. June 8, 2011); cf
People v. Traster, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68o, 688 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that fraudulent stock
investment is larceny by trick (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 8.7, at 396 (1986))).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) cmt. e, illus. 7 (1977); see, e.g., Boyett v. State,
159 So. 2d 628, 630-31 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 835 (12th ed.
1932) (discussing assault and battery) ("[I]n any view, consent obtained through fraud ...
is no defense.").
15. NLRB v. Dadourian Exp. Corp., 138 F.2d 891, 892 (2d Cit. 1943).
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nonconsent; it requiresforce, and deception isn't force.' But this answer hardly
answers, not without an explanation of why rape requires force - an
explanation that has never been forthcoming. The force requirement makes
rape law blind to all the situations in which people, often women, are coerced
or manipulated into sex through social pressure or alcohol or other means
falling short of physical violence." As a result, "[v]irtually all modern rape
scholars want to modify or abolish the force requirement as an element of
rape,"'" and some jurisdictions have already eliminated it. 9
But this means rape law has a serious problem. Existing doctrine has no
trouble dismissing rape-by-deception claims, but only because of the
much-decried force requirement. If rape law were really to eliminate the force
requirement-as so many argue it should, as many statutes have already
seemingly done, and as courts have begun to do - then sex-by-deception would
and should be rape, because the legal definition of rape would then be sex
without consent, and a defrauded "consent," like a coerced one, is no consent at
all.
This problem is by itself a considerable challenge. It implicates the most
fundamental questions about what rape is and how the law ought to define it.
But the problem runs deeper still.
Just as we speak of "antidiscrimination law," referring to an interlocking set
of constitutional rights, statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions, so too we
might speak of "sex law," comprising the same elements. And we might say
that sex law in this country is converging on a single unifying principle: the
right to sexual autonomy.
16. See, e.g., Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1o86, 1087 (Mass. 2007).
17. See, e.g., SUsAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 69 (1987) ("[T]he force standard continues to
protect ... conduct which should be considered criminal. It ensures broad male freedom to
'seduce' women who feel themselves to be powerless . . . and afraid . . [, and] to intimidate
women and exploit their weakness and passivity . . . ."); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 15 (1998)
(arguing that the force requirement "places an imprimatur of social permission on virtually
all pressures and inducements that can be considered nonviolent. It leaves women
unprotected against forms of pressure that any society should consider morally improper
and legally intolerable").
is. David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 322 (2ooo).
19. See supra note 9; see also Charlie Savage, U.S. To Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/o1/07/us/politics/federal-crime
-statistics-to-expand-rape-definition.html (reporting that the FBI has, after ninety years,
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The idea behind sexual autonomy is simple. People have a right to decide
for themselves with whom and under what circumstances to have sex. The
legal fight for this principle has been waged on several fronts, including:
Constitutionalization. Constitutional sex law commenced in earnest with
Griswold v. Connecticut,2 o and the Court's most important recent decision in this
field, Lawrence v. Texas," is widely read to stand for a right of sexual
autonomy."
Decriminalization. Long before Lawrence, sodomy prosecutions were rare,
and older sex crimes such as fornication and seduction had been abolished,
reflecting a conviction that private, consensual sex was not an appropriate
target of criminal law.23
Sex codes. Sexual misconduct has long been regulated privately on college
campuses and elsewhere. But while such sex codes used to aim at prohibiting
sex, today their aim is different: to ensure that sexual activities are
consensual.7
Rape law reform. Finally, over the last several decades, radical
transformation came to rape law as well. Old doctrines have been discarded,
reopening core questions about how rape ought to be defined," and today, the
central purpose widely ascribed to rape law is the protection of sexual
autonomy."6
Thus sexual autonomy seems to provide a single, clear, appealing
foundation for the regulation of sex in the United States, unifying its major
components. But there is an anomaly in the system: sex-by-deception. From
autonomy's viewpoint, fraud is as great an evil as force." Precisely by failing to
punish rape-by-deception, sex law fails to vindicate sexual autonomy. This
failure would seem to put rape law in tension not only with its own central
principle, but with the rest of American sex law, including Lawrence. 8
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that sex-by-deception does in
fact pose all the difficulties just outlined. It requires a rethinking of what rape
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a law banning the use of contraception).
21. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a law criminalizing homosexual sex).
22. See infra Section I.A.
23. See infra Section I.B.
24. See infra Section I.C.
25. See infra Subsection I.D.3.
26. See infra notes 102-114 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part II and notes 148 and 152.
28. See infra Section III.A.
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really is. It also requires sex law to pick its poison-to decide if it does or
doesn't stand for sexual autonomy, whether that means embracing
rape-by-deception or reconsidering Lawrence. Finally, it requires a reevaluation
of the ideal of autonomy itself, at least as applied to sexuality.
Part I will trace the emergence of sexual autonomy as the fundamental
principle of American sex law. Part II will lay out rape-by-deception doctrine
and the difficulties it creates. Part III maps the main options available to rape
law once these difficulties are exposed: (1) sticking with the force requirement
in order to say no to rape-by-deception; (2) embracing sexual autonomy and
with it a much broader doctrine of rape-by-deception; and (3) staking out a
compromise in which coercive sex would be rape, but deceptive sex would not.
This compromise would, I will argue, capture many people's intuitions, beat a
retreat from the force requirement's worst aspects, and bring rape law closer to
vindicating sexual autonomy.
Parts IV and V of this Article -well, Parts IV and V should probably never
have been written. Many readers will disagree with them. To begin with, I will
reject the coercion-based compromise just described. Its half-logic is too
unprincipled, its results contradictory. Instead, Part IV will oppose the
principle of sexual autonomy altogether. Notwithstanding Lawrence, I will
suggest that there is and should be no fundamental right to sexual autonomy.
The great principle of individual autonomy hits a kind of limit in sexuality,
where the pursuit of bodily and psychological conjugation makes the goal of
autonomy strangely chimerical, at odds with desire itself.
But how should rape be understood if not in terms of sexual autonomy?
Part V lays out an answer. Rape violates what I will call the right to
self-possession. The right to self-possession is best illustrated by two other
offenses that also violate it: slavery and torture. Rape should be thought about,
I will argue, the way we think about those two crimes. Every act of rape may
not be an act of slavery or torture, but all rape shares core elements of both.
A warning: this way of seeing rape will have at least one glaring weakness.
It will suggest that the much-maligned force requirement might not be so
malign after all.
Taking Parts I to V together, the argument will be as follows: Current
rape-by-deception doctrine is unjustifiable given today's predominant,
sexual-autonomy-based view of rape. If rape means sex without consent,
sex-by-deception ought to be rape. At a minimum, given principles of sexual
autonomy, sex-by-deception ought to be very broadly criminalized, if not
under the name of rape, then as a separate (perhaps lesser) offense. My
conclusion, however, is that sex-by-deception should not be broadly
criminalized; instead the mistake lies in the autonomy-based view of
rape -indeed in the whole notion of sexual autonomy as a fundamental right.
1380
122:1372 2013
THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION AND THE MYTH OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY
For American sex law in general, this conclusion suggests a rethinking of
Lawrence and related cases. For rape law, the implication is that rape cannot be
understood merely as unconsented-to sex; a certain kind of force, to be
explained below, is in fact central to the crime.
I. SEXUAL AUTONOMY AS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF
AMERICAN SEX LAW
Not long ago, the consensuality of a sex act was irrelevant to its legality.
And almost all sex was illegal.
If an unmarried man and woman had sex, it was fornication.29 If either had
a spouse, it was adultery in the married party and fornication in the other, or
adultery in both.3o If a man lured a woman into bed through a promise of
marriage, he committed seduction.' If one was black and the other white, they
were chargeable with miscegenation." If both were male, it was sodomy.3 If
both were female, it was plainly an abomination, although no one seemed to
know exactly what kind?4
Even a married couple could go to jail for having the wrong kind of sex. If
they sought to prevent childbirth, they faced more criminal sanctions.36 Merely
a9. See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 9 P. 532, 534-35 (Idaho 1886) (holding consent irrelevant for a
conviction of fornication).
30. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF STATUTORY CRIMES § 656, at 474-75
(3d ed. 1901).
31. 1 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 288 (1931).
32. At least thirty-four states and territories in the 186os, and twenty-six as of 19o, criminalized
miscegenation, often defined in terms not only of marriage, but of fornication or other
"forms of illicit intercourse." GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN
AMERICAN LAW 78-81 (1910).
33. Or "buggery," or the "crime against nature." See, e.g., State v. Long, 63 So. 18o, 180 (La.
1913).
34. See, e.g., Thompson v. Aldredge, zoo S.E. 799, 8oo (Ga. 1939) ("[T]he crime of sodomy
proper cannot be accomplished between two women, though the crime of bestiality may
be." (quoting 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAw § 754 (11th ed. 1912))).
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA
1861-2003, at 69, 92 (2008) (describing the express criminalization of lesbian sex beginning
in the 1920S).
35. As late as 1976, a federal appellate court upheld the conviction of married defendants for
consensual sodomy. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4 th Cir. 1976).
36. See JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 257 (1994) (noting that as of 1885 twenty-four states and the federal government
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possessing information about contraception could be a crime.
Thus went traditional American sex law. The only safe sex was
heterosexual, copulative, marital intercourse." No kind of autonomy figured in
this legal landscape -not sexual, 39 not male, not female, not marital.
Today, things are slightly different. In the last several decades, a sex-law
revolution has taken place, in which sexual autonomy has emerged as
something like a fundamental right. This transformation has occurred across at
least four areas: the right to privacy; sex crimes; sex codes; and rape law.4o
A. Sexual Autonomy and the Right to Privacy
When the "right to privacy" first appeared in Griswold,4 it did not imply a
right of sexual autonomy. The Griswold Court repeatedly emphasized that the
case involved "marriage"" and stressed the "repulsive" prospect of police
scouring the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" for evidence.4 ' Thus
Griswold's privacy looked potentially quite narrow.44
But in Eisenstadt v. Baird,4 striking down a ban on the distribution (rather
than, as in Griswold, the use) of contraceptives, the Court declared that the
right to privacy protected every individual, "married or single, . . . from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
prohibited the sale of contraceptive devices); id. at 253-55 (discussing the rise of
anti-abortion laws).
37. See id. at 257.
38. In 1978, the Supreme Court could still refer to "marriage" as "the only relationship in which
the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
39. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1998) ("[I]t seems clear that the
official purposes of [traditional] rape law . . . did not include the protection of sexual
autonomy.").
40. Another part of this story is the constitutional protection given to sexually graphic
expression, which has allowed pornography to become a multibillion-dollar industry. See,
e.g., John A. Humbach, 'Sexting'and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433, 441
& n.45 (2010).
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
42. Id. at 486.
43. Id. at 485-86.
44. The idea that the right to privacy might apply only or specially to marital relationships was
arguably buttressed by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that a law banning
interracial marriage violated the Due Process Clause.
45. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."46 Suddenly privacy
reached far beyond marriage and private places like the bedroom. Under
Eisenstadt, the new right to privacy seemed hardly to be about privacy at all.'
What, then, was it about? No one really knew. But a year later, when the
Court decided Roe v. Wade, privacy began to look like it really might mean
sexual autonomy. Arguably, one of the most important elements of sexual
autonomy is reproductive autonomy. Thus did Richard Posner feel justified in
declaring that "in a series of decisions between 1965 and 1977, the Supreme
Court created a constitutional right of sexual or reproductive autonomy, which
it called privacy.""8
But if Roe held out the promise of sexual autonomy, that promise was
dashed in Bowers v. Hardwick.49 There the Court upheld the criminalization of
consensual sex acts traditionally considered immoral and offensive."o Seventeen
years later, however, Lawrence reversed Bowers.
Interestingly, the term "right to privacy" never appears in Lawrence.
Instead, the majority opinion speaks of autonomy. Justice Kennedy began that
opinion by declaring, "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes ...
certain intimate conduct."" He also quoted Justice Stevens's Bowers dissent,
calling the following two points "controlling":
First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . . Second, individual
decisions by married [and unmarried] persons, concerning the
intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to
produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the
[Constitution].s2
Where "two adults," the Court concluded, with "full and mutual consent from
each other, engage[] in sexual practices," the "State cannot . . . control their
46. Id. at 453.
47. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 8o B.U. L. REV. 359, 360 n.2
(2000) ("Many scholars suggest that the term 'privacy' itself is a misnomer . . .
48. RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 324 (1992).
49. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a conviction for homosexual sodomy).
5o. See id. at 196.
51. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
52. Id. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime."ss
Given such statements, it's no wonder that so many read Lawrence to have
enshrined sexual autonomy as a constitutional right." Indeed, under Lawrence,
the Fifth Circuit has struck down a ban on the sale of "sexual stimulation"
devices, holding that such a statute violated an individual's "right to engage in
private intimate conduct of his or her choosing."ss
B. Sexual Autonomy and Decriminalization
Over the course of the twentieth century, private (noncommercial)
consensual sex was almost wholly decriminalized. At times this transformation
was constitutionally mandated. Often, however, state legislatures and
prosecutors acted on their own.
Thus, fifty years ago, penal fornication and adultery statutes were already
so widely unenforced that the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code described
them as "dead-letter statutes."ss In many states, formal repeal followed.
53. Id. at 578.
54. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 334
n.4 (2003) (reading Lawrence to support the proposition that "adults have [a] fundamental
right to autonomy in intimate choices"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Implied Fundamental Rights, in
20TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTs LITIGATION 167, 171 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice,
Course Handbook Set. No. 700, 2003) (describing Lawrence as vindicating a "right to
engage in private consensual homosexual activity"); James A. Gardner, State Constitutional
Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91
GEO. L.J. 1003, 1042 (2003) (asserting that Lawrence guarantees "a personal right of private
sexual autonomy"); Hon. Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Speech, Rediscovering the Common Law,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 761 n.17 (2003) (reading Lawrence as standing for a "right to
sexual autonomy"). But see, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4, 97 (2003)
("[T]he theme of autonomy floats weightlessly through Lawrence, invoked but never
endowed with analytic traction.").
ss. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Martin v.
Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005) (striking down a fornication statute under Lawrence).
s6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on status of section, at 434-36 (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
57. See Richard Green, Fornication: Common Law Legacy and American Sexual Privacy, 17
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 226, 226 (1988); Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery
Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 837, 842 (2006). Over the last
several decades, state prosecutions for fornication and adultery have not disappeared,
although they have been rare. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization:
From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 747, 756-57 (2005)
(describing a few such cases while also noting that "there have been no prosecutions in most
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Similarly, the crime of seduction long ago passed into oblivion.
Indeed, decades before Lawrence, many states had already repealed or
stopped enforcing their sodomy laws." Rather than being mandated by the
Supreme Court, the widespread decriminalization of consensual sex paved the
way for the "sexual revolution" of the 196os and thus, ultimately, for the
Court's own decisions in cases like Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence.
C. Sexual Autonomy and the New Sex Codes
Outside criminal law, private sexual misconduct regulations have long been
common, especially at colleges. Traditionally, such sex codes aimed at blanket
sexual suppression. By contrast, the typical college sex code today permits sex
on campus, seeking only to ensure one goal: consent.
For example, Duke University in 2010 defined "sexual misconduct" as "any
physical act of a sexual nature perpetrated against an individual without
consent." 6' Under this provision, no genuinely consensual sex is misconduct.
Moreover, consent must be "informed,",6 , suggesting that deception might
negate it, and "power differentials," whether "[r]eal or perceived," can be
states in recent years"). In the military, however, adultery offenses have still been regularly
prosecuted. See Katherine Annuschat, Comment, An Affair To Remember: The State of the
Crime ofAdultery in the Military, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1161, 1191 & n.195 (2010).
58. See Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'": A
Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 394-98 (1993) (discussing the
movement, beginning in the 1930s, to abolish seduction statutes).
s9. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 34, at 176-78 ("For several years after Stonewall, sodomy
decriminalization indeed proceeded rapidly in many states.").
6o. See ERNEST EARNEST, ACADEMIC PROCESSION: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
COLLEGE, 1636 TO 1953, at 1o8 (1953) (describing the ways that American colleges
historically sought to "limit sexual activity"). The rules at the coeducational Hillsdale
College in 186o were probably not unusual: "Students are prohibited upon pain of
expulsion from visiting those of the other sex at their rooms, or receiving visits from them at
their own." FIFTH ANNUAL CATALOGUE OF THE OFFICERS AND STUDENTS OF HILLSDALE
COLLEGE 40 (186o). Homosexual sex provoked, as usual, the harshest reprisals. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM WRIGHT, HARVARD'S SECRET COURT: THE SAVAGE 1920 PURGE OF CAMPUS
HOMOSEXUALS (2005) (describing the secret tribunal used at Harvard in 1920 to investigate
and punish homosexuality).
61. THE DUKE COMMUNITY STANDARD IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR UNDERGRADUATES 2012-2013, at
47 (Stephen Bryan, David Frankel & Valerie Glassman eds., 2012), http://registrar.duke.edu
/sites/default/files/unmanaged/bulletins/communitystandard/2o12-3/ds%20guide%20202
-13.pdf(reflecting policies for the 2012 to 2013 academic year).
62. Id.
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coercive, even when such coercion is "unintentional.""
Yale's new 2011 provisions are similar. "Sexual misconduct" at Yale
includes any "conduct of a sexual nature that is nonconsensual"; "sexual
assault" includes "any kind of nonconsensual sexual contact." 6 Consent in turn
is
defined as clear, unambiguous, and voluntary agreement ... to engage
in specific sexual activity. Consent cannot be inferred from the absence
of a "no"; a clear "yes," verbal or otherwise, is necessary. . . . Talking
with sexual partners about desires and limits may seem awkward, but
serves as the basis for positive sexual experiences shaped by mutual
willingness and respect.
Consent cannot be obtained from someone who is asleep ....
Consent to some sexual acts does not imply consent to others, nor does
past consent to a given act imply ongoing or future consent.6 s
Assuming these regulations are to be taken seriously -as a disciplinary code
Yale intends to enforce, rather than, say, a display of legally useful institutional
concern - some interesting results follow. Blowing a kiss to one's boyfriend
without asking him first could fit the definition of sexual misconduct at Yale
("conduct of a sexual nature" without a "clear 'yes' or "unambiguous"
"agreement" to that "specific . . . activity"). Kissing a girlfriend when she's
asleep is apparently "assault." Even where two students willingly have sex,
either (or both) could be charged with sexual assault if there was any
"ambiguity" about which acts they had consented to.61
63. Id.
64. Definitions of Sexual Misconduct, Sexual Consent, and Sexual Harassment, YALE C.,
http://yalecollege.yale.edu/content/definition-sexual-misconduct-sexual-consent-and-sexual
-harassment (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
65. Id.
66. The Department of Education's 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter may have been a motivation.
See Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
Rosslyn Ali, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr
/letters/colleague-2o11o4.html (warning universities of potential Title IX violations).
67. Definitions of Sexual Misconduct, Sexual Consent, and Sexual Harassment, supra note 64
(warning that when "there is ambiguity about whether consent has been given, a student
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Given such consequences, it may be wrong to take Yale's regulations at face
value. Nonetheless, they strongly express a sexual-autonomy-based ideal of full
disclosure, of "positive sexual experiences" achieved through "[t]alking," and
of advance, affirmative consent to each specific act engaged in.
D. Sexual Autonomy and Rape Law
Like the Supreme Court's right-to-privacy jurisprudence, rape law has been
for decades a body of law in search of a principle, but has now seemingly found
that principle in sexual autonomy.
1. The Enigma of Rape Law
An unanswered question lies at the heart of rape law. Why is rape a crime
of its own?
Every rape is an assault or battery. Every rapist could be punished on that
ground alone. The law, however, does not treat rape that way. Rape law makes
an assault involving particular body parts a special crime of its own - one of the
most serious in all of criminal law, punishable by death until not long ago,6
and often by life imprisonment still today.69 The crime of rape is in this respect
unique. There is, for example, no special crime of assaulting someone's hands
or face.70 Nor is there a general crime of penetrating the body. Someone who
force-feeds another has committed assault and battery, if she has committed an
offense at all.
To ask why rape is its own crime may, I know, seem deliberately obtuse or
wantonly insensible. Rape victims probably don't see an "enigma" here.
Perhaps only someone who hasn't been raped-or perhaps only a man who
hasn't been raped-would see things that way.
But the question still needs to be asked. As we will see, in traditional rape
law, a morality of feminine virtue gave a simple, clear explanation of rape's
status as a distinct and vile crime. Modern rape law, however, has ostensibly
repudiated that morality. The question is whether modern law can still treat
68. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional for
the crime of rape); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (reaffirming Coker in
cases of child rape).
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124 (2011); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-1 (2011); Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 1(4) (U.K.).
70. But cutting off a hand or disfiguring a face can be mayhem. See, e.g., People v. Ausbie, 20
Cal. Rptr. 3 d 371, 376 (Ct. App. 2004).
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rape as a distinct crime without relying on what it claims to repudiate.
Understanding rape law's history is important for two reasons: first, to see
why modern rape law embraced sexual autonomy in place of the old rejected
sex morality; and second, to see how this morality remains covertly operative
today-in the law of rape-by-deception.
2. Rape as a Crime ofDefilement-Female Defilement
Why then, for traditional judges, was rape so vile and so different from
other assaults?" The answer would have been simple: rape defiled women.
No injury to a woman short of death, and perhaps not even death, was
worse than rape: "An injury to her person more violent than the rape of a
young girl-her defloration and ruin-is impossible."" "There is no form of
violence more odious either in law or in morals than rape."" In the torrid
words of one supreme court:
What is the annihilation of houses or chattels . . . compared with the
destruction of female innocence; robbing woman of that priceless jewel,
which leaves her a blasted ruin, with the mournful motto inscribed
upon its frontals, "thy glory is departed?" Our sacked habitations may
be rebuilt, but who shall repair this moral desolation? How many has it
sent ... with unbearable sorrow, to their graves?74
To rape was to "shame and dishonour" a woman.s Or in the sympathetic
phrase of a seventeenth-century digest compiled for the governance of the New
World, to rape a woman was to "make a whore" of her.'"
This worldview was distinctly not gender neutral. It was women and
71. I'm not looking here for an answer, however true it might be, of the form: "The purpose of
traditional rape law was to subordinate women and entrench men's property rights in
them." I'm asking about the law's self-understanding-what judges, lawyers, and others of
this era would have said.
72. Callaghan v. State, 155 P. 308, 309 (Ariz. 1916).
73. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 411, at 447 (Boston, Little
Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1858).
74. Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 728-29 (1860).
75. 2 HECTOR DAVIES MORGAN, THE DOCTRINE AND LAW OF MARRIAGE, ADULTERY, AND
DIVORCE 351 (Oxford, W. Baxter 1826).
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girls whom sex destroyed, leaving them a blasted ruin.' For men, on the other
hand, sex was hardly an injury worse than death; even men who criminally
seduced unmarried girls were merely "rakes," "rascals," and "knaves"-not
"ruins." 8 On the whole, sex buttressed manhood, whereas it destroyed
maidenhood and defiled femininity.
Traditional rape law's picture of female purity is too well known 9 to
require much spelling out. Yet the connection between the old morality and
some of rape law's basic doctrines has been surprisingly underappreciated.
Consider the infamous marital rape exception.
Today, the marital exemption is almost invariably explained on one of
three grounds. Most often, it is said to have rested on the notion that a wife
permanently consented to sex with her husband-an explanation offered by
77. "Ruin" is a frequent motif in sex cases from this era. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 35 S.E. 161, 164
(Ga. 1900); Wood v. State, 189 S.W. 474,477 (Tex. Crim. App. 1916); see also, e.g., Biggs, 29
Ga. at 729 (rape violates 'female purity" (emphasis added)); Litchfield v. State, 126 P. 707,
713 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912) (rape is "moral desolation and spiritual assassination").
78. Smith v. Milburn, 17 Iowa 30, 36 (1864) ("rake"); Breon v. Hinkle, 13 P. 289, 294 (Or. 1887)
("knave"); Adams v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App. 250, 251 (1885) ("rascal"). In fact, the entire
crime of "seduction" (intercourse obtained through a promise, especially a false promise, of
marriage) was built on female-purity premises: only males could be guilty; only females
victimized; and in most states the woman's prior "chastity" was an element of the crime. See
BISHOP, supra note 30, §§ 638-640, at 462-65; see also, e.g., People ex rel. Scharffv. Frost, 120
N.Y.S. 491, 491 (App. Div. 1909) (noting that a person was guilty of seduction if he, "'under
promise of marriage, seduces and has sexual intercourse with an unmarried female of
previous chaste character"' (quoting statute)).
79. See, e.g., Thomas A. Mitchell, We're Only Fooling Ourselves: A Critical Analysis of the Biases
Inherent in the Legal System's Treatment of Rape Victims (or Learning from Our Mistakes:
Abandoning a Fundamentally Prejudiced System & Moving Toward a Rational Jurisprudence of
Rape), 18 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & Soc. POL'Y 73, 77 (2010) ("Throughout most of history, rape
was considered a crime against the chastity of the victim . . . ."); see also, e.g., Michelle J.
Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape
Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 53 (2002) ("Embedded within [traditional] rape law,
therefore, was an informal, though powerful, normative command that women maintain an
ideal of sexual abstinence in order to obtain legal protection . . . ."); Coughlin, supra note 39,
at 45-46 (referring to the "social attitudes and practices that stigmatize female sexual
activity" that used to be incorporated in the "definition of rape").
so. Under traditional law, a man could not rape his wife. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 230
F.2d 521, 526 (4 th Cir. 1956) ("It is well settled that a husband ... cannot be convicted as
a ... principal in the rape of his wife . . . ."); 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 1119(2) (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 8th ed. 1892); 1 WHARTON,
supra note 8, S 553, at 514 (ioth ed. 1896).
1389
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Hale and repeated many times thereafter," although judges and scholars have
long noticed that Hale seems to have made up the rationale out of whole
cloth.82 The two other theories are that the common law viewed a wife as the
husband's "property" or the marital couple as "one person.""
All three accounts overlook a far simpler explanation: marital sex did not
defile a woman. Whether a wife consented to sex, wanted it, hated it, or was
forced to submit to it, she wasn't defiled by it. Thus a law protecting women
from sexual defilement had nothing to do with the plight of women sexually
assaulted by their husbands.
When we today look back uncomprehendingly on the marital rape
exemption, we tend to forget the marital fornication exemption, the marital
seduction exemption, the marital prostitution exemption, and so on; there was a
marital exception to almost all traditional criminal sex law. Matrimony alone
sacralized a woman's defloration, moralized erotic desire, and legitimized its
issue. So long as rape was understood as a crime of female defilement, the
crime was impossible between a husband and wife.
The one exception proved the rule: a man could be convicted of raping his
wife if he helped another man force sex on her."s For in that case, the wife was
subjected to an act "despoiling of [her] virtue."86 Actually, a second exception
re-proved the rule. If a husband forced unnatural sex on his wife, an "infamous
81. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *629 (Philadelphia, Robert
H. Small ed., 1847); see also, e.g., Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 819, 827 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986); State v. Scott, 525 A.2d 1364, 1369 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38,
41 (N.J. 1981); ESTRICH, supra note 17, at 72-73; ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL
RELATIONS 12 (2003).
8z. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572 (N.Y. 1984); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF
THE CRIMINAL LAw 186 & n.1 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883).
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Mass. 1981) ("It is generally
thought ... that the basis of the spousal exclusion probably lies in the ancient concept of the
wife as chattel."); Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573; ESTRICH, supra note 17, at 73-74.
84. Neither fornication, adultery, nor seduction could be committed by a husband with his
wife; indeed for seduction, even a subsequent marriage was usually a defense. 2 WHARTON,
supra note 8, § 1760, at 518. Prostitution would have covered what many women did in the
marital bedroom if marriage hadn't been exempted -an exception that still exists today. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-7-201(1) (2011).
85. 2 BISHOP, supra note 8o, § 1119(2), at 645; e.g., Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8
Gray) 489, 491 (1857); People v. Chapman, 28 N.W. 896 (Mich. 1886).
86. Chapman, 28 N.W. at 898; see also, e.g., State v. Dowell, 11 S.E. 525, 525 (N.C. 1890)
(asserting that forcing one's wife into sexual intercourse with another man "prostitute[s]"
her (quoting I HALE, supra note 81, at *629)).
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indignity,"" he could also be convicted-not of rape, but of sodomy (evidently
she ceased to be his property, and they ceased to be one person, if he did
that) ."
Rape as a crime against female virtue explains other definitive features of
traditional doctrine as well-for example, the staggering legal fact that men
could not be raped.9 Rape was ruin, and sex did not ruin men.9o The "utmost
resistance requirement"' also fit comfortably with the traditional view, as a test
of whether women displayed the virtue that rape law existed to protect.92
Similarly, traditional rape law was notoriously hostile to claims by "fallen"
women.93 Officially, the victim's past unchastity was irrelevant. 94 But a
woman's past sexual derelictions could still be put before the jury to show
consent. 95 Modern critics excoriate this doctrine, arguing that it allowed rapists
87. Crutcher v. Crutcher, 38 So. 337, 337 (Miss. 1905).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Trudeau, 22 C.M.R. 485 (1956) (upholding conviction of assault
with intent to sodomize wife); Mahone v. State, 209 So. 2d 435 (Ala. Ct. App. 1968); Smith
v. State, 234 S.W. 32, 32-33 (Ark. 1921); Quinn v. Quinn, 6 Pa. D. & C. 712, 714-15 (Ct. Corn.
PI. 1925); R v. Jellyman, (1839) 173 Eng. Rep. 637 (Patteson, J.).
89. E.g., 2 BISHOP, supra note 8o, § 1115(2), at 643 ("Rape is a man's ravishment of a
woman. . . ."); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210 (defining rape as "the carnal
knowledge ofa woman forcibly and against her will" (emphasis added)).
go. A study of the history of the legal treatment of sexual assaults against children observes:
"On the rare occasions when reformers and commentators did mention sexual assaults on
boys by men, they presented those acts differently from instances of sexual violence against
girls. . . . Both did suffer physical injury. Girls, however, also experienced 'ruin . . . ."
Stephen Robertson, 'Boys, of Course, Cannot Be Raped': Age, Homosexuality and the
Redefinition of Sexual Violence in New York City, 1880-1955, 18 GENDER & HIST. 357, 360
(20o6).
91. A woman claiming rape used to be required to show that she had resisted the defendant "to
her utmost." E.g., Reynolds v. State, 42 N.W. 903, 903-04 (Neb. 1889); People v. Dohring,
59 N.Y. 374, 382 (1874); Brown v. State, io6 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906). For trenchant
criticisms, see ESTRICH, supra note 17, at 29-41; and SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 19-20.
92. See, e.g., Dohring, 59 N.Y. at 384 ("Can the mind conceive of a woman . . . revoltingly
unwilling that this deed should be done upon her who would not resist so hard and so long
as she was able?").
93. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 89, at *213 (asserting that European rape law excluded
prostitutes).
94. 2 BISHOP, supra note 8o, 5 1119(1), at 645 (even a "common prostitute" can charge rape).
Some judges explained this rule on the ground that every sex act inflicted an additional
defilement. See State v. Fernald, 55 N.W. 534, 535 (Iowa 1893) ("That which is already
impure or unclean may be defiled by making more impure or unclean.").
95. E.g., 2 BISHOP, supra note 8o, § 1119(1), at 645. Wigmore maintained that a young woman's
unchastity was also admissible to prove lack of credibility and even psychological instability.
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to be acquitted because their victims were sexually active. 6 This criticism is
completely justified, but what it criticizes was the doctrine's very point: tacitly,
if not explicitly, (male) juries understood that rape was a crime of
defilement-and how could sex defile a woman who had no virtue to defile?
3. The Turn to Sexual Autonomy
In the last several decades, rape law has undergone radical change. The
marital rape exemption is history." The rape of men and boys was finally
recognized.9" The utmost resistance requirement has been abolished." New
statutes exclude evidence of a rape claimant's past sexual conduct."oo
These reforms, however, have created a conceptual gap. Rape law has
officially repudiated the feminine-virtue premises of the traditional era. But
how then does it explain why sexual assault is different from other assaults? If
not defilement, what is the special violation that rape inflicts?
One possible answer: there is none. On this view, the idea of rape as a
unique, outrageous violation is merely a noxious residue of old, invidious
sexual moralities. Later I'll return to this possibility.o' For now, we are asking
how modern rape law explains itself- how rape's existence as an independent
crime, graver than almost any other assault, is explained today, now that the
older feminine-purity premises are no longer available.
Enter sexual autonomy. The earliest judicial statement that rape violates a
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAw § 924a (2d ed. supp. 1934). Some states disagreed. See, e.g., Shay v. State, 90 So. 2d
209, 211 (Miss. 1956) ("[W] here want of consent is not in issue ... evidence of the female's
want of chastity is immaterial and inadmissible.").
96. See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 17, at 49; SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 25.
97. See Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence a Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as Allegory, 24 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 554 (2oo) (noting the abolition of the exemption in every
state); see also, e.g., R v. R, (1992) 1 A.C. 599 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (abolishing
the exemption). A marital exemption remains in statutory rape. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 6o6
S.E.2d 127, 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
98. See Siegmund Fred Fuchs, Note, Male Sexual Assault: Issues of Arousal and Consent, 51
CLEv. ST. L. REV. 93, III (2004) ("[A]ll but three jurisdictions in the United States have
gender-neutral rape statutes.").
99. See Katherine E. Volovski, Domestic Violence, 5 GEo. J. GENDER& L. 175, 178-79 (2004).
100. Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for
Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 990-91 (20o8) (discussing the passage of rape
shield laws in every state and by Congress).
101. See infra Section V.C.
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woman's sexual "autonomy" was probably the Supreme Court's 1977 Coker
decision - in which the Court also held that rape was not sufficiently heinous to
merit capital punishment:
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt
for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the
latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be
established. Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate violation of self."O2
This frequently quoted"o3 passage offered a new explanation of the
distinctive violation effected by rape. Rape may not violate a woman's purity,
but it does violate her "autonomy" -and specifically her sexual autonomy, her
"privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be
established."o 4
Subsequent cases would reaffirm this idea,' explaining that sexual choices
are among an individual's most private and intimate. As the Supreme Court of
New Jersey put it in the well-known M. T. S. case:
The decision to engage in sexual relations with another person is one of
the most private and intimate decisions a person can make. Each person
has the right not only to decide whether to engage in sexual contact
with another, but also to control the circumstances and character of that
contact.o6
With this language, the right of sexual autonomy is fully articulated, and
rape becomes expressly understood as unconsented-to sex: "We conclude,
therefore, that any act of sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant
1o2. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
1o3. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (20o8); Evans v. Ercole, No. 07-CV-6686,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37078, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2010); Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d
221, 224 (Ga. 1985); State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d lo63, 1o66 (La. 1996); State v. Brand, 363
N.W.2d 516, 518 (Neb. 1985).
104. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
ios. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 990 (ioth Cir. 1996) ("Rape is a traumatic and
heinous violation of personal integrity and autonomy."); People v. Soto, 245 P-3d 410, 418
(Cal. 2011) (describing rape as a violation of "sexual autonomy"); People v. De Stefano, 467
N.Y.S.2d 506, 512 (Suffolk Cnty. Ct. 1983) ("Rape is an abomination not because it is an
assault on innocence, but because it is an assault on freedom. The gravity of rape . .. is in
the injury to autonomy. . . ." (citation omitted)).
1o6. State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992).
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without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the specific
act ... constitutes the offense ....
Autonomy is the dominant concept in today's leading rape scholarship. To
Patricia Falk, the "central value protected by sexual offense provisions is sexual
autonomy . . . , the violation of which represents a unique, not readily
comparable, type of harm to the victim.",1os Stephen Schulhofer has argued
extensively in favor of "sexual autonomy" and the "right to sexual
self-determination." o9 Philosopher Joan McGregor concludes that the "moral
wrongness of rape consists in violating an individual's . . . sexual
self-determination and the seriousness of rape derives from the special
importance we attach to sexual autonomy."no. The citations could be
multiplied."'
Outside the United States, the sexual-autonomy view of rape is also
widespread. Germany's criminal code classifies sexual offenses as crimes
"against sexual self-determination."" British scholars have invoked sexual
autonomy to interpret England's recently reformed rape statutes."' In the
words of one international court, the "true common denominator" of all rape
may be the "violation[] of sexual autonomy.114
107. Id. at 1277.
io8. Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 Aluz. L.
REV. 131, 187 (2002).
iog. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 16-17.
11a. McGregor, supra note to, at 236.
iii. See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 39, at 2; Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the
Diference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780,
1785 (1992) (defining "sexual autonomy" as "the freedom to refuse to have sex with any one
for any reason"); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 598 (1996) ("[T]he violation of a woman's sexual autonomy conveys greater disrespect
for her worth than do most other violations of her person."). Dorothy Roberts was among
the first to thematize rape as a problem of female autonomy. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape,
Violence, and Women'sAutonomy, 69 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 359 (1993).
112. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESEGESETZBLAT-r I [BGBL.
I], at §§ 174-184 (Ger.).
113. See, e.g., Jonathan Herring, Mistaken Sex, 2005 CRIM. L. REV. 511, 516 (treating sexual
autonomy as rape law's central principle); Vanessa E. Munro, Constructing Consent:
Legislating Freedom and Legitimating Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41
AKRON L. REV. 923 (2008).
114. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, S 44o (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
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E. Summary: Putting Privacy, Decriminalization, Sex Codes, and
Rape Law Together
In 1962, when the American Law Institute omitted fornication and adultery
from the proposed Model Penal Code, an explanatory note declared that
"private immorality should be beyond the reach of the penal law.""' Three
years later, Griswold announced the right to privacy. Together,
decriminalization and constitutionalization arguably produced a new, modern
fundamental right: the right to sexual autonomy. Today this same right has
entered into rape law, which found itself in need of a new structuring principle
shorn of the sexism and defilement ideology of the traditional era.
Sexual autonomy has two sides. First, consenting adults have a right to
engage in sex of whatever variety in the privacy of their bedrooms. That's the
point of Lawrence and decriminalization. Second, if an individual doesn't want
sex of whatever variety-whether with a certain person, or with persons
possessing a certain trait, or in certain circumstances, or at all-he or she has a
right not to have it. That's the point of modern sex codes and rape law.
Thus would American sex law today appear to be animated by a single
principle. Every individual has the right to decide what kind of sex to have,
with what sorts of people, and in what circumstances.
II. THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION
Or so at least the story might go. But this picture of American sex law can't
account for a peculiar and thorny anomaly: sex-by-deception.
A. The General Rule and Its Two Exceptions
The subject was already perplexing over a century ago. Ordinarily, as an
important treatise observed, "if.. . the consent is obtained by fraud . .. the law
deems there was no consent.""' But in the "peculiar" case of rape, the rule was
otherwise: "Still the majority of English judges have held, that the peculiar
offense of rape is not committed where a fraudulent consent is obtained. . . .""
115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication, at 439 (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
116. 1 BISHOP, supra note 73, § 343, at 384.
117. Id. (emphasis added). There were dissenting voices, although they acknowledged the
prevailing rule. See, e.g., People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427, 437-38 (1865) (Cooley, J.)
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To rationalize this result, common law judges were obliged to reject one of
two venerable propositions: (1) that fraud vitiated consent; or (2) that rape was
sex without consent. Some chose the first option:
It seems to me that the proposition that fraud vitiates consent in
criminal matters is not true . . .. [Flor the definition of rape is having
connection with a woman without her consent; and if fraud vitiates
consent, every case in which a man . . . commits bigamy, the second
wife being ignorant of the first marriage, is also a case of rape. Many
seductions would be rapes, and so might prostitution procured by
fraud, as for instance by promises not intended to be fulfilled."'
Most judges, however, were unprepared to deny that fraud vitiates consent.
Fortunately for them, a different definition of rape was available, supported by
many authorities, according to which rape required force."9 Especially in
America, where the force requirement was often laid down by statute,
nineteenth-century courts had a clear basis for rejecting rape-by-deception:
"Rape is the carnal knowledge of any female . . . 'by force and against her
will,"' and "fraud is not force."' 20 American courts have adhered to this
reasoning ever since."
(criticizing the rule against rape-by-fraud); R v. Flattery, (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 410 at 413 (Kelly,
C.B.) (Eng.) ("This case is therefore not within the authority of those cases which have
decided, decisions which I regret, that where a man by fraud induces a woman to submit to
sexual connection, it is not rape."); R v. Case, (1850) 169 Eng. Rep. 381 at 384 (Platt, B.)
(Eng.) ("If she did not consent, then it was a rape; for there can be no distinction in
principle between a dissent which makes connexion an assault, and a dissent which makes it
a rape: fraud and force stand on the same footing. [Our cases to the contrary] require re-
consideration.").
118. R v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23 at 43 (Stephen, J.) (Eng.).
iig. See, e.g., 2 BISHOP, supra note 8o, §5 1113-15, at 642-44 (noting the "common" definition of
rape as "unlawful carnal knowledge, by a man of a woman, forcibly and against her will,"
and setting forth a "corrected" definition as "unlawful carnal knowledge, by a man of a
woman, forcibly, where she does not consent"); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 89, at *210
(defining rape as "the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will").
120. State v. Brooks, 76 N.C. 1, 3 (1877) (quoting statute); see also, e.g., Don Moran v. People, 25
Mich. 356, 364 (1872) ("If the statute ... did not contain the words 'by force,' or 'forcibly,'
doubtless a consent procured by such fraud as that referred to, might be treated as no
consent . . . ."); Wyatt v. State, 32 Tenn. 394, 398-99 (1852) ("Fraud . . . cannot be
substituted forforce, as an element of this offence. . . .") (emphasis added).
u21. See, e.g., Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d io86, 1089 (Mass. 2007) (holding that
rape requires force and therefore rejecting a claim of rape-by-deception); People v. Hough,
607 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885, 887 (Crim. Ct. 1994) (same); Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 36 Va.
Cir. 188 (Cir. Ct. 1995) (same).
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There was just one problem. In certain circumstances, the law held that
women deceived into sex were raped. By the end of the nineteenth century,
British judges could identify two established exceptions: "In Reg. v. Flattery ...
representing the act as a surgical operation . . . was held to be . . . rape ...
[W] here consent was obtained by the personation of a husband ... the passing
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 ... 'declared and enacted' that
thenceforth it should be deemed to be rape .... "m
These two exceptions -sex falsely represented as a medical procedure, and
impersonation of a woman's husband -have been for over a hundred years the
only generally recognized situations in which Anglo-American courts convict
for rape-by-deception.' Both exceptions remain the law of England.'" In
Canada, they were recognized until at least 1982 and are apparently still good
law today.' In Australia, a High Court decision expressly recognized both
exceptions in 1958." In the United States, courts have long endorsed the
medical exception,"' while the spousal-impersonation exception is the law of at
122. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. at 43 (Stephen, J.). An Irish decision recognized rape by
husband-impersonation in 1884. R. v. Dee (1884) 14 L.R. Ir. 468 (C.C.R.). A Scottish
"Martin Guerre" came to life after the Great War, and the impersonator was found guilty of
rape. See H.M. Advocate v. Montgomery, (1926) J.C. 2 (Scot.).
123. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 119 (1998)
(observing "the two archetypical rape by fraud cases, fraudulent medical treatment and
husband impersonation").
124. See, e.g., R v. Linekar, [1995] Q.B. 250 (C.A.) [255] (appeal taken from Eng.). By statute,
England recently broadened the husband-impersonation exception to cover impersonation
of any "person known personally to the complainant." Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42,
§ 76(2)(b) (U.K.).
125. Until 1982, Canada's rape statute expressly included the case of "personating [the victim's]
husband." Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, § 143 (b)(ii). The 1983 statute
abolished the crime of rape, replacing it with "sexual assault" offenses. See Canada Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, §§ 271-73. The Canadian Supreme Court has suggested that the
new statute provides a "more flexible" rape-by-fraud doctrine. R. v. Cuerrier, [1998]
2 S.C.R. 371, 372 (Can.); see R. v. Crangle, [2010] 266 O.A.C. 299 (Can. Ont. C.A.)
(upholding a conviction where one twin had sex with the other twin's girlfriend).
126. Papadimitropoulos v. The Queen (1958) 98 CLR 249, 257-59 (Austl.).
127. See, e.g., People v. Minkowski, 23 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Pomeroy v. State, 94
Ind. 96 (1883); People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 424, 438 (1865); Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020
(Wyo. 1986). Some opinions hold that this exception applies only to patients who don't
realize they are being sexually penetrated. See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr.
122 (Ct. App. 1985). Others suggest the exception extends to convincing a patient that sexual
penetration is medically required. See, e.g., Eberhart v. State, 34 N.E. 637 (Ind. 1893); see
also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.90 (2004) (making such conduct a felony punishable by
up to ten years in prison).
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least fourteen states, ,8 including California,'29 and is recognized in the Model
Penal Code.'
B. The Conventional Justifications -and Why They Fail
To explain rape-by-deception doctrine with its twin exceptions,
contemporary courts and commentators repeat a kind of mantra. Fraud "in
the factum," we are told, vitiates consent; fraud "in the inducement" does
not.'' The two exceptions- medical misrepresentation and spousal
impersonation- represent fraud "in the factum," while virtually all other
misrepresentations are fraud "in the inducement."'3 This distinction is said to
be the law's "traditional formula" for distinguishing lies that vitiate consent
from lies that do not.3
No matter how often repeated, this argument makes no sense. First and
foremost, it's simply false that "fraud in the inducement" fails to vitiate consent
elsewhere in the law. Standing for the contrary proposition are countless cases
involving larceny,'" trespass,"' and contract.' 6 Among the lies that serve as
128. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud as
a Defense to Statutory Rape, ioi Nw. U. L. REV. 75, 1oo & nn.164-65 (2007).
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(5) (West 20o8).
130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(c) (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 48 M.J. 214, 216 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at
125; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 143 (3d ed. 2001); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 767 (3d ed. 2000); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 215 (3d ed. 1982); Christopher & Christopher, supra note 128, at 83-84.
132. See, e.g., Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 123; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 131, at 1079-81;
Christopher & Christopher, supra note 128, at 83.
133. Falk, supra note 123, at 157 ("The traditional formula for [determining the validity of]
consent in fraud cases is the dichotomy between fraud in the factum and fraud in the
inducement."); see PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 131, at 1079; Christopher & Christopher,
supra note 128, at 83.
134. See, e.g., Glenda K. Harnad et al., Criminal Law: Crimes Against Property, 18A CAL. JUR. 3D
§ 137 (2012) (citing numerous cases of larceny achieved through fraudulent inducement).
One of the most famous, early larceny-by-trick cases involved a false promise to return a
horse within a few hours. The King v. Pear, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (K.B.).
135. E.g., State v. Maxwell, 672 P.2d 590, 594 (Kan. 1993) (finding entry trespassory where
defendants feigned interest in selling a watch); State v. Ortiz, 584 P.2d 13o6, 1308 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1978) (finding entry trespassory where defendants claimed to have come to a house to
help the owner's daughter); see also Jay M. Zitter, Use of Fraud or Trick as "Constructive
Breaking" for Purpose of Burglary or Breaking and Entering Offense, 17 A.L.R.5TH 125 § 3a
(1994) (citing numerous similar cases).
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exemplary consent-breakers are misrepresentations concerning the deceiver's
occupation' or other personal characteristics - the same kind of lies at issue in
many rape-by-deception cases. If the false meter reader cannot claim consent
when he enters a person's home,"' why can a false bachelor or movie mogul
claim consent when he enters a woman's body?
On top of this, the fact/inducement distinction fails to explain at least one,
and perhaps both, of the two exceptional scenarios it is supposed to explain. A
woman who has sex with a man posing as her husband knows she is having
sex. Thus if husband impersonation is "fraud in the factum," such fraud
includes lies about the partner's personal identity. But if that's so, how can
impersonation of a paramour be fraud "in the inducement"?'" Indeed, how can
bachelor impersonation be ruled out? To be sure, impersonating a husband
deeply changes the moral, emotional, factual, and legal implications of sex, but
so does pretending to be unmarried.
Even the medical-misrepresentation scenario is not so easy to explain as
fraud in fact. The lie here may concern solely the man's purposes.4 o But if a
misrepresentation of purpose counts as fraud "in fact," what about a man who
pretends to be in love? The false doctor represents penetration as an act of
professional care, the false lover as an act of emotional care.
Thus the fact/inducement distinction conflicts with countless fraud cases
outside rape law, cannot explain paradigmatic examples of consent-vitiating
136. It is hornbook contract law that a person "fraudulently induced to enter into a contract has
not assented to the agreement." 26 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LoRD, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 69.1 (4 th ed. 2003); see, e.g., Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601
F.3d 852, 85 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding claim that "fraud voids a contract ab initio-because
faud in the inducement precludes mutual assent") (second emphasis added).
137. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 173 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1965).
138. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3 d 1o66, 1073 (9th Cit. 2004); J.H. Desnick, M.D.,
Eye Servs., Ltd. v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7 th Cir. 1995); Commonwealth v. Hayes,
460 A.2d 791, 796-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 173 cmt. b,
illus. 2 (1965).
139. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 131, at 216 (asserting that impersonation-of-paramour
is fraud in the inducement); see also, e.g., PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE
DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 198-99
(2004) (arguing that courts' treatment of husband-impersonation as fraud "in the factum"
undercuts the entire fact/inducement logic). The outcomes are much better explained as
moral judgments hiding behind a supposedly analytic distinction. See text accompanying
note 145.
140. This is not so when the woman doesn't even know the doctor is entering her, but it is so
when the doctor (or pseudo-doctor) falsely convinces her that intercourse is a medical
treatment.
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lies, and does not even explain the two exceptions it is meant to. Let's consider,
therefore, a quite different argument justifying existing doctrine.
Matters of the heart, it might be said, are beyond the limits of judicial
competence. No evidence of a legally cognizable kind can prove what one
person really feels for another; judges and juries would only make a mess of
such matters.14' That's why most deception claims are properly excluded from
rape law, and also why rape law permits the two long-established exceptions,
which involve provable facts, not subjective emotions.
But facts concerning emotions are routinely put before juries. In a murder
case, the defendant might be shown to have hated the victim -or to have been
in love with her and jealous. As a matter of fact, it's not uncommon for the
defense in a rape case to try to show that the complainant was in love with the
accused (and is lying about the alleged rape). How then could the accused's
feelings for the complainant be ruled out of evidentiary bounds?
In any event, an institutional competence argument cannot come close to
sustaining existing rape-by-deception doctrine. The two misrepresentations
that already turn sex into rape are plainly not the only examples of "objective"
lies, easily amenable to proof. Claims about a person's marital status or job or
wealth would be equally easy to test in court.142
So the law's treatment of rape-by-deception presents a riddle. Courts know
that fraud vitiates consent and recognize as much in rape law's two exceptional
141. See, e.g., Hyman Gross, Rape, Moralism, and Human Rights, 2007 CluM. L. REV. 220,
224 ("Separating innocuous falsehoods from pernicious deceptions would present
insurmountable difficulties in a court of law . . . ").
142. A related argument might defend current rape-by-deception doctrine on the ground that the
complainant might have slept with the deceiver anyway; how are courts to know if the
deception really mattered, and shouldn't criminal law be reluctant to make the defendant's
liability turn on the complainant's (counterfactual) state of mind? The obvious problem
with this kind of argument is that it applies to all criminal fraud laws. See, e.g., Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1999) (noting the "well-settled" rule that courts must
determine materiality in fraud prosecutions). In securities cases, courts have managed to
deal with the exceedingly difficult question of whether a single failure to disclose one piece
of information is material against the backdrop of a great deal of true information. See, e.g.,
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (20i) (reaffirming that the
"materiality requirement is satisfied when there is 'a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the total mix of information made available"' (quoting Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted))). To claim that
somehow in sexual contexts, materiality suddenly becomes insuperable would not be an
argument for, but a rationalization of, existing doctrine. That the prosecution might not be
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scenarios, but they close their eyes to that knowledge in virtually every other
sex-by-deception case. Sometimes lies turn sex into rape; most of the time they
don't. The official justification for this doctrine is no justification, and the most
obvious alternative account - an institutional competence argument - fails just
as badly. How then is rape-by-deception doctrine to be explained? 43
C. Deception and Defilement
The mystery isn't really very mysterious. Our rape-by-deception doctrine
developed long before the modern revolution in sex law. Current doctrine
makes perfect sense - on the defilement logic of traditional rape law.
When courts in rape cases determine that the alleged victim "consented,"
what is it that the person is supposed to have consented to? The answer today
is, of course, to sex. But that was not the answer under traditional rape law.
Traditional law never defined rape as unconsented-to sex as such. Rape
was nonmarital sex with a woman who had not consented to that. A woman
who knowingly agreed to have sex out of wedlock had done all the consenting
she needed to do. Regardless of how deceived she might have been about any
other facts or circumstances, she had willingly had sex with a man to whom she
was not married -and had therefore in fact consented to the very act that rape
law was supposed to protect her against.
Sex without consent did not mean in the old days what those same words
mean today. Consent in traditional rape law was not a measure of autonomy. It
was a measure of virtue.
"A virtuous female," as the courts of the traditional era were happy to
define her, "is one who has not had sexual intercourse . . . out of wedlock,
knowingly and voluntarily."'" A virtuous female was not, therefore, one who
had engaged in sex with a man because she believed he was rich or Jewish or a
bachelor interested in a serious relationship. Those facts were morally and
legally irrelevant. So long as a woman had willingly engaged in nonmarital
sex, she had not been ruined against her will. She had voluntarily participated
in - consented to - her ruin. And therefore she could not claim rape.
143. Below I'll consider other arguments justifying rape law's exclusion of sex-by-deception (for
example, sexual deception is ubiquitous; people expect to be lied to in sexual contexts),
freed from the requirement of explaining the two exceptions. See infra Section II.E. Here,
the question is the riddle posed by existing law.
144. Marshall v. Territory, ioi P. 139, 143 (Okla. Crim. App. 1909); see also Cloninger v. State,
237 S.W. 288, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (quoting from this passage in Marshall); State v.
Dacke, 109 P. 1050, 1051 (Wash. 1910) (same).
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By contrast, in the two exceptional scenarios, where sex-by-deception could
qualify as rape, the woman had precisely not consented to out-of-wedlock sex. If a
man impersonated her husband (not a paramour, not a rich bachelor, not
anyone else), the woman believed she was having marital sex; her consent was
therefore "innocent.""s Similarly, if a woman was convinced that she was
undergoing a medical procedure, then she arguably believed, at least in a moral
sense, she wasn't having sex at all.' 6 Thus in the two exceptional scenarios, the
woman hadn't knowingly surrendered her virtue.'4 ' But in almost all other
cases of deception, the deceived woman had consented to nonmarital sex -the
only consent that mattered.
So the riddle is solved. Rape law's exclusion of almost all sex-by-deception
claims followed from the fact that in such cases the woman had willingly had
nonmarital sex. Though deceived, she had willingly surrendered her virtue and
thus could not claim rape. But the twin exceptions also made perfect sense,
because they involved virtuous women -women who had not knowingly had
sex with a man to whom they weren't married.
D. What Sexual Autonomy Says - or Ought To Say -About
Rape-by-Deception
Unfortunately, to explain our rape-by-deception doctrine is also to show
that it no longer makes sense -not, at least, in an autonomy-based rape law.
Assuming that sexual autonomy means anything, it surely includes the right
not to have sex with a married man if you don't want to. It surely includes the
right not to have sex with someone who isn't interested in a serious
relationship. These rights can be violated by lies just as much as they can by
force or threat.
Fraud is one of autonomy's two great enemies, along with force. Just as
145. Eg., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124-25 (Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added)
("[T]he woman's consent is to an innocent act of marital intercourse while what is actually
perpetrated upon her is an act of adultery." (quoting PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 131, at
lo81)); see, e.g., R v. Clarence, [1888] 22 Q.B.D. 23 at 44 (Eng.) ("Consent to [sex] with a
husband is not consent to adultery."); R v. Dee, (1884) 14 L.R. Ir. 468 (C.C.R.) [4791
("[S]he intends to consent to a lawful marital act . . . but did she consent to the act of
adultery? Are not the acts themselves wholly different in their moral nature?").
146. E.g., Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 124; PERKINS &BOYCE, supra note 131, at 215.
147. Cf Coughlin, supra note 39, at 31-32 (observing that in the two exceptional scenarios, the
woman's actions would not have been criminal under fornication or adultery laws).
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coercion destroys autonomy, so too does deceitful manipulation."' Thus a rape
law genuinely committed to sexual autonomy would reject the force
requirement, defining rape solely in terms of consent. 149 And if rape is sex
without consent, sex-by-deception ought to be rape.
E. Squaring Sex-by-Deception with Sexual Autonomy?
Let's consider some objections to this conclusion. Each will argue that
sex-by-deception is not rape, while insisting that rape means unconsented-to
sex. This line of argument may tempt many readers. Those who have long
believed both that rape is sex without consent and that rape-by-deception is
not rape will naturally want to believe these two positions are not in conflict.
Let me begin, therefore, with a reminder: our law's almost categorical
exclusion of rape-by-deception claims began in traditional rape law's rejection
of sexual autonomy. A woman had no right, legal or moral, to have nonmarital
sex; so long as she consented to that act of defilement, she had not been raped,
no matter how deceived she was about any other facts. It would be quite
surprising if rape law's deception doctrine, inherited virtually unchanged from
the traditional era, could suddenly be justified on the basis of the very
148. " [L]ying is wrong because it violates human autonomy. Lying forces the victim to pursue
the speaker's objectives instead of the victim's . . . ." David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy,
and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 355 (1991); see also, e.g., 1 JOEL FEINBERG,
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO OTHERS 116 (1984) ("[A] person's
consent is fully voluntary only when he is a competent and unimpaired adult who has not
been threatened, misled, or lied to about relevant facts . . . ."); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 378 (1986) ("Coercion and manipulation subject the will of one person to that
of another. That violates his independence and is inconsistent with his autonomy."). For a
comparative view, see Jacques du Plessis, Fraud, Duress and Unjustified Enrichment: A
Civil-Law Perspective, in UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: KEY ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 194, 196-200 (David Johnston & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2002), which
canvasses civil and common law tort regimes and states that "it should be apparent that
fraud and duress" are widely viewed as involving "serious violations of individual
autonomy."
149. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at loo-ol (analyzing rape and a right of sexual
autonomy in terms of consent and therefore criticizing the force requirement); McGregor,
supra note lo, at 233, 236 (criticizing the force requirement on sexual autonomy grounds).
The M. T. S. decision, mentioned earlier, is also illustrative. There the New Jersey Supreme
Court, having embraced a right of sexual autonomy, held that where nonconsent is proven,
the force requirement is satisfied by the act of intercourse itself State ex rel. M.T.S. 609 A.2d
1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992); see also State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 147 (Iowa 2011) (holding
that Iowa's rape statute, which defines the crime as sex "by force or against the will," did not
require physical force).
1403
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
principle-sexual autonomy-whose rejection it was built on. Yet that is what
every one of the objections about to be considered claims.
1. Victims ofDeception Do in Fact Consent
First objection: when sex is imposed through brute force, the victim's will
is physically overborne. He never says yes; he never consents. But that's not so
with deception. Here the victim does in fact say yes. Of course sex-by-
deception isn't rape (it might be said); the victim consented."o
The correct comparison, however, is to a victim compelled to submit at
gunpoint, who does say yes. If that "consent" is rejected on grounds of
autonomy, as it must be, the same should go for a "consent" procured by fraud.
Neither consent is given in conditions allowing an autonomous choice.s' That
is why libertarians object foundationally to both force and fraud.s 2
2. Deceived Sex Is Wanted Sex
But at least in deception cases, someone might say, the victims physically
desire the sex they engage in (at the moment they engage in it), and thus
should be viewed as having consented to it. There is a huge difference between
having sex one physically desires and (as in forcible rape) having sex one
doesn't. When a person is deceived into sex, "the encounter is one that -at the
time-she believes she wants," from which she "may experience sexual
pleasure.""
This reasoning is badly flawed. To begin with, it marries consent to the
physical "wantedness" of sex and hence to pleasure. That position has a
venerable history, but it is unacceptable: it suggests that a rapist should
videotape or brain-scan his victim, trying to preserve evidence that the victim
150. See Gross, supra note 141, at 224. This argument tracks traditional rape law. See, e.g., 2
BISHOP, supra note 8o, § 1122, at 647 ("Though her consent was obtained by fraud, still she
consented."). The problem was and is that everywhere else in the law, consent obtained by
fraud is no consent at all.
is. See Strauss, supra note 148, at 355, and the other sources cited supra note 148.
152. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcH-Y, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at ix (1974); see also AYN RAND,
The Nature of Government, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 144, 150-51 (1964) ("Fraud
involves a similarly indirect use of force: it consists of obtaining material values without
their owner's consent, under false pretenses or false promises.").
153. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 156; cf POSNER, supra note 48, at 393 (sex achieved through
"the common misrepresentations of dating and courtship" is "merely humiliating," rather
than "disgusting as well as humiliating").
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actually "experience[d] sexual pleasure."'- Pleasure is not consent. A person
aroused by forced sex' is not a rape-free zone, susceptible to imposition by
anyone at any time.
In any event, it simply is not true that all victims of sexual deception
physically desire the sex they agree to. Consider two people, each of whom
agrees to have sex with a man, identically deceived about the man's wealth,
marital status, and feelings. The first person desires sex and takes pleasure
from it; the second is repulsed, but submits in hope of a lucrative, long-term
relationship. Are courts really to hold that the first was not raped (because the
sex was physically desired), but the second was (because the sex was
disgusting)?
3. Lies Are Customary and Expected in Sexual Contexts
Next objection: sexual lies are so rife that no one actually relies on them -or
at least no reasonable person does. "[W] ords said to arouse feelings and to 'put
one in the mood' are understood to be part of a game that lovers play. . . .
Thus no one is deceived, because no one is (reasonably) taken in.
It's true that a healthy skepticism properly discounts much of what people
say in sexual settings, but it seems overwrought to conclude that there can be
no reasonable reliance at all. Sooner or later most of us come to believe certain
things about the people we have sex with. We can be badly fooled; we might
even marry into a lie. Whether on the first date or the tenth, the "it's a game
that lovers play" argument will eventually run out. It will not explain why
rape-by-deception goes unpunished when reasonable people are deceived
about facts material to their sexual decisions.
Moreover, if sexual deceivers started going to prison in large numbers for
rape-by-deception, many fewer lies would be told and reliance would become
even more reasonable. So as a defense of existing rape-by-deception doctrine,
this argument is not only overstated. It's circular.
154. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 156.
155. Cf ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 218, 223 (1993) (discussing The Story of
0 and the feminist response to the "conflict between pleasure and ideal posed by the
undeniable female eroticization of sexual submission").
156. Gross, supra note 141, at 224.
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4. Deception Need Not Undermine Autonomy
"You seem to be arguing that all deception vitiates autonomy," it might be
objected. "No serious account of autonomy takes that view. An agent
autonomously consents by assenting under conditions justifying the further
conclusion that he has given a morally or legally significant permission. These
conditions are not easy to specify, but clearly they don't require complete
information or truth. For sexual autonomy, only a very few basic facts need be
known; I'm not prepared to say exactly which facts, but they don't include the
other's income, marital status, feelings, etc."
In fact I haven't argued that all lies undermine autonomy; only material lies
reasonably relied on do. But the critical claim here is that knowing "a very few
basic facts," even while being lied to about others, preserves the autonomy of
sexual consent. Why should this be so? There are two versions of this claim.
The strong version would assert that most deception, unlike physical
threats, actually leaves autonomy basically intact. "Consider the duress defense
in criminal law," it might be said, "and the absence of a corresponding deception
defense. Threats of serious bodily harm make an action unattributable to an
agent; if you rob a bank under duress, you're not guilty. But if you were merely
lied to-about your take, for example, or your accomplice's romantic interest in
you -you are guilty. The duress defense reflects the core insight that coerced
parties lose their autonomy while deceived parties do not."
This objection is important, but it relies on a misleading premise. It
presumes that the traditional criminal defenses track autonomy, so that the
absence of a general "deception defense" in criminal law would indicate that
deceived persons retain their autonomy, or at least are so judged by the law.
This premise is incorrect.
The traditional criminal defenses track not autonomy, but blameworthiness
or guilt. Self-defense exonerates, but in no way undermines autonomy; it
exonerates because it justifies. The reason a bank robber fooled by confederates
who plan to abscond with all the loot has no defense is that this deception
doesn't make him any less blameworthy or less guilty of bank robbery. If, by
contrast, he had been fooled into believing that he was not robbing a bank, but
simply making a lawful withdrawal of funds, he would have a defense. In other
words, there is a deception defense in criminal law when the deception is such
that it absolves the deceived person of blameworthiness or guilt.
When law does track autonomy-when it is directed at protecting
14o6
157. I thank Gideon Yaffe for bringing this objection to my attention.
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autonomously given consent, rather than establishing an excuse from criminal
liability-it almost invariably protects persons victimized by deception as well
as by duress. Thus if you are gulled by the proverbial false meter reader, you
can claim trespass because his deception undermined your right to decide who
may and may not enter your house. Similarly, the false stockbroker uses no
duress, but still takes your property without your autonomous consent, which
is why you can claim theft.
A rape victim is not a criminal defendant. She is not called on to show that
she has a valid "defense" or that she should be excused for having engaged
in sexual activity. According to the autonomy-based view of rape, all
she is required to show is that her autonomy-her right to make an
autonomous choice about her sexual activity-was violated. And on that view,
rape-by-deception ought to be rape, just as larceny-by-deception is larceny.
A weaker version of the "basic facts are enough" claim would focus on the
particular lies involved in rape-by-deception. "Imagine a surgeon,"
this argument might go, "who had falsely told a patient he was a bachelor
seriously interested in a relationship with her. Her consent would still be
upheld in court, provided she knew all the medically relevant information. ,8
Rape-by-deception doctrine is identical. Just as the law can reject this
'surgery-by-deception' claim while still protecting patient autonomy, so too
can the law reject rape-by-deception while still protecting sexual autonomy."
But the analogy doesn't hold. Not every misrepresentation is material. The
lies that break consent in any particular legal context will depend on what must
be consented to, which will in turn depend on what values or interests the law
in question is attempting to serve." 9 Patient consent laws are interested in
medical consent, to which the only material facts might be said to be the medical
facts, not the doctor's sexual intentions. But for the very same reason, lies
about sexual intentions could not be deemed per se immaterial to sexual
consent.
Materiality represents a judgment about what facts a person has reason to
take into account in making a certain decision, given the interests that the law
protecting that decision seeks to further. Thus a patient consent law aiming at
15. See, e.g., Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d IS, 20 (Conn. 2006) (holding that for the purposes of
informed medical consent, only the nature of the procedure, its risks, its anticipated
benefits, and the alternatives to the procedure are legally material).
ise. See J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Servs., Ltd. v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7 th Cir. 1995); cf
WESTEN, supra note 139, at 199 ("Ultimately, . . . [courts] must make normatively
contestable judgments as to the additional knowledge, if any, that subjects must possess" if
assent "is to constitute a defense.").
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an informed medical decision will ask which facts a person has reason to take
into account from a medical point of view."'o But by the same logic, the
question in sexual matters must be what a person has reason to take into
account from a sexual point of view. And marital status, feelings, seriousness of
interest, and even religion are all factors reasonable people could well take into
account in making sexual decisions; thousands do so every day.
The only way to limit the material sexual facts to the "basic facts"
(essentially the facts of the sex act) is, uncoincidentally, to adopt traditional
rape law's judgment of materiality, in which the one decision that counted was
the woman's decision to have sex, full stop. A rape law dedicated to autonomy
has no basis for so cramped a judgment of what is material. To pretend
otherwise is to cloak traditional sexual morality in the modern rhetoric of
autonomy. At a minimum, an autonomy-based rape law should see rape
whenever, to quote Israel's Supreme Court, someone "does not tell the truth
regarding matters critical to a reasonable [person], and as a result of his
misrepresentation [that person] has sexual relations with him."'
III. THREE OPTIONS, INCLUDING A COMPROMISE
The conundrum of sex-by-deception therefore leaves rape law in an
uncomfortable position. Three principal positions are available. The first two
are obvious, with obvious difficulties. The third is a compromise.
A. Sticking with Force
The first alternative is for rape law to stick with the force requirement.
Rape isn't sex without consent; it's forcible sex without consent. The virtue of
this option (if it is a virtue) is that it excludes rape-by-deception -and does so
without invoking antiquated notions of feminine virtue.
But this way of dismissing rape-by-deception flies in the face of the
160. To which the best answer might be that a surgeon's falsely playing a lover should be held to
invalidate the patient's medical consent. I am accepting the contrary position only arguendo.
161. CrimA 2358/06 Selimann v. State of Israel (Sept. 17, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription); see also R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 374 (Can.) (opinion of L'Heureux-
Dub6, J.) (asserting that Canada's new sexual assault statutes were enacted to protect
"autonomy" and therefore the victim's consent should be held vitiated whenever "the
complainant would not have submitted" but for the defendant's "dishonesty").
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near-universal scholarly consensus decrying the force requirement." 1 It offers
no explanation why pressures and manipulations falling short of physical force
should not turn sex into rape. Indeed, without more, it offers no explanation
why force does turn sex into rape: for if the answer were only that force vitiates
consent, then sex-by-deception ought to be rape as well.
More fundamentally, the force requirement turns its back on the right of
sexual autonomy. As a result, it not only conflicts with what is today
understood as rape law's fundamental principle. It is also in deep tension with
Lawrence v. Texas-assuming that Lawrence stands for a right of sexual
autonomy."'
I don't mean that rape law's force requirement is unconstitutional; statutes
can be in profound tension with constitutional principles without being
unconstitutional. By way of analogy, imagine a state statute comprehensively
regulating abortion, but specifically immunizing from all liability (criminal or
civil) any person who uses deception or concealment to prevent a pregnant
woman from obtaining an abortion. Doctors could lie to pregnant women with
impunity to deceive them into childbirth. Pathologists could falsify
amniocentesis results.
Depending on your views about abortion, you will presumably react to this
scenario by condemning either the statute or Roe v. Wade.16 4 If you believe that
Roe properly protects a woman's right to choose abortion, you will object that
the statute allows private actors to deny or obstruct that right. If on the other
hand you consider abortion the killing of a human being, you might say that
the statute is right because Roe is wrong. Either way, by permitting private
actors to engage in abortion-prevention-by-deception, the statute would be a
rebuke to Roe -deeply in tension with that case, even if not unconstitutional
thereunder.
Now apply this logic to sexual autonomy. If Lawrence really holds that
every individual has a right to sexual autonomy, rape law's permission of
sex-by-deception - permitting private actors to deceive people into sex - would
be analogous to a statute permitting private actors to deceive women into
childbirth. It would be a rebuke to Lawrence. It would allow private actors to
deny or obstruct a freedom that constitutional law had deemed fundamental.
162. See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 18, at 322 ("Virtually all modern rape scholars want to modify or
abolish the force requirement as an element of rape."); sources cited supra note 17.
163. See supra note 54 (citing authors who have read Lawrence as standing for a right of sexual
autonomy).
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Thus does the force requirement, which sustains existing rape-by-deception
doctrine, turn its back on what is arguably the reigning principle of American
sex law. So long as rape law adheres to the force requirement, it permits
sex-by-deception and refuses to vindicate the right to sexual autonomy.
B. Embracing Sexual Autonomy
The second alternative is the reverse: abandoning the force requirement
and embracing instead the right of sexual autonomy. This option would have
the mirror-image advantages and disadvantages of the first.
Appealingly, it would eliminate any conflict between rape law and the
principle of sexual freedom -the privilege to choose for oneself, in an exercise
of one's own autonomous will, under what circumstances to have sex. In
addition, it would have the virtue of eliminating those aspects of current rape
law that critics of the force requirement most vigorously oppose. For example,
a rape law untethered to force could finally penalize men who use nonviolent
pressures, manipulation, or alcohol to induce sexual cooperation.
On the other hand, sex-by-deception would have to be a crime as well. If
our criminal sex law were really designed to vindicate a right of sexual
autonomy, sex plus lies should equal jail time, whether the lie was a false claim
of bachelorhood, "I love you," or any other material misrepresentation
reasonably calculated to induce another person to have sex. To be sure,
the crime need not be graded as severely as violent rape. It could be called
rape-in-the-second-degree or just "rape-by-deception." But in one form or
another, if rape is sex without consent, sex-by-deception ought to be rape.
C. The Compromise: Not Force, but Coercion
Is rape law therefore obliged either (1) to stick to the force requirement or
(2) to criminalize sex-by-deception? No: a third way is possible.
Suppose rape law replaced the force requirement with a coercion
requirement. A coercion requirement would cure the worst problems of the
force requirement, reject rape-by-deception claims, and effect a partial
reconciliation between rape law and sexual autonomy. For these reasons, many
readers may find this solution appealing.
One of the most widely condemned implications of the force requirement is
its absolution of defendants who use nonviolent means of pressuring or
manipulating vulnerable people, particularly women, into sex. In an egregious
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case called Mlinarich, a sixty-three-year-old man arranged to become the
guardian of a thirteen-year-old girl, securing her release from a juvenile jail.'
On her fourteenth birthday, the man ordered his ward to undress and serve
him sexually.'6 6 She refused, but he eventually induced her to submit by
threatening to send her back to jail."' Over the next few weeks, he tried twice
to have sexual intercourse with her, failed both times, sodomized her, and
finally succeeded in having intercourse.168 Under the force requirement, the
Pennsylvania courts acquitted Mlinarich of rape. 6 9
A coercion-based rape law would easily produce a different result.
Similarly, a coercion requirement would be satisfied where a principal compels
a student to have sex by threatening to expel her,"' or where an employer
compels sex by threatening to fire the employee. Thus a coercion requirement
would pick up at least some of the worst cases that fall through the cracks of
the force requirement.
Moreover, a coercion requirement would bring rape law closer to the ideal
of sexual autonomy. But deception is not coercion. So a coercion-based rape
law would still exclude most cases of sexual deception.
Many readers may, therefore, find in a coercion-based rape doctrine a
happy medium between a rape law so narrow that it prohibits only sex induced
by physical force and a rape law so broad that it jails people who have sex while
concealing their true age, looks, income, or degree of romantic interest. A
coercion requirement offers an appealing compromise between the two
extreme positions, reaching desired results while bringing rape law a step
closer to sexual autonomy.
D. Conclusion: The Problem with Coercion
Probably this Article should now be finished. We have seen how the
problem of rape-by-deception drives a wedge into rape law, requiring it to
choose between force and autonomy. And now we've struck a compromise,




169. Of course Mlinarich was guilty of "statutory" rape, but an appellate court reversed his
conviction of "real" rape, and the supreme court affirmed by an equally divided vote. Id. at
1342.
170. See State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990) (acquitting the defendant of rape).
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offering a partial reconciliation between them.
The problem is that the compromise dissolves on contact with reflection.
The coercion requirement's exclusion of rape-by-deception is contradicted by
its own internal logic. Coercion is objectionable because a coerced "yes" does
not reflect a valid or genuine consent. But the same is true of a deceived "yes."
An anti-coercion principle is attractive because coerced sex is unconsented-to
sex. But if unconsented-to sex is rape law's target, then deceptive sex ought to be
punished as well.
Could a coercion-based account of rape claim to rest on something other
than a consent principle? Duress, perhaps?
Invoking duress adds nothing to the argument. First of all, coercion
and duress are largely interchangeable terms in law.17' Thus to say that a
coercion-based rape law could rest on duress is like saying that a
coercion-based rape law could rest on coercion. Moreover, when courts explain
why duress is legally important, they typically say that duress (like coercion)
undermines "free" choice, causing the victim to act in a way that doesn't reflect
his "free will or free agency"' 72 or true consent.'73 But fraud does the same.
Finally, as noted above, a duress-based rape law would make sense only if rape
law were concerned not with the victim's autonomy, but rather with her
blameworthiness or responsibility for having had sex.
A coercion rule for rape law would claim its strength from the principle of
sexual autonomy -the idea that people have a right not to engage in sex they
don't consent to. But by excluding sexual deception, the coercion compromise
conflicts with sexual autonomy. It can exclude rape-by-deception only by
contradicting its own logic.
171. United States v. Dowd, 417 F.3d io8o, 1086-87 (9 th Cir. 2005) (upholding a jury instruction
stating that the terms "coercion" and "duress" are interchangeable); United States v. Helem,
186 F.3d 44 9, 453 (4 th Cir. 1999) (same). Where the two terms are distinguished, "duress" is
typically said to be coercion accomplished by "physical force" - a qualification that would not
assist the objection. E.g., State v. Woods, 357 N.E.2d 1059, io65 (Ohio 1976) (emphasis
added) (quoting McKenzie-Hague Co. v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 73 F.2d 78,
82-83 (8th Cir. 1934)).
172. E.g., Wheeler v. Comm'r, 528 F-3d 773, 779 (ioth Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 RIcHARD A. LORD,
WILuISTON ON CONTIMcTs § 71:11 (4 th ed. 2003)).
173. See, e.g., Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563, 568-69 ( 7th Cir. 2011) (citing Valance v.
Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269,1278-79 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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IV. THE MERITS OF DECEPTIVE SEX AND OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY
Which leaves rape law with two paths to choose from. Two postulates of
American sex law turn out to be at war. The first is that most sex-by-deception
is not rape or even a crime. The second is that individuals have a right to sexual
autonomy. The first is established by the force requirement. The second is
supported by Lawrence, the decriminalization of consensual sex, and modern
sex codes as well. But these two postulates cannot both stand.
It's time to question both these postulates. One of them has to give.
Perhaps sex-by-deception should be rape - or at any rate a crime - in which case
our criminal sex law could and should embrace sexual autonomy without cavil.
Or perhaps instead the supposed right to sexual autonomy is wrong, in which
case rejecting rape-by-deception is much less problematic, but Lawrence v.
Texas, to the extent that it stands for such a right, would have to be
reconsidered.
In what follows, I try to take on these difficult and foundational questions.
My conclusions will be as follows. First, good reasons underlie the intuition
that sex-by-deception is not rape or, generally, a crime. Second, the supposed
right of sexual autonomy is a myth and should be rejected.
A. Should Sex-by-Deception Be a Crime?
The case for criminalizing sex-by-deception is obvious. Fraud is typically
illegal. Deceiving people into sex can be particularly invidious. It can be
demeaning and humiliating. It can impose substantial risks and fateful
consequences, including pregnancy or illness, on people without their genuine
consent. And of course it prevents parties to the sexual bargain from reaching
the efficient, welfare-maximizing deals at which they rationally aim."'
It's a crime to trick people out of their property. How can it be lawful to
trick them out of their bodies-how can the law give less protection to
women's bodies (and not only women's) than it gives to chattel? We have
already seen that existing rape-by-deception doctrine rests on an obsolete
morality of female sexual virtue. Why shouldn't rape law rid itself of this final
vestige of traditional rape law and extend unreservedly to deception?
In this Section, I offer reasons why a general crime of sex-by-deception
174. For the view that rape law should be understood as increasing the efficiency of sexual
transactions, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1193, 1199 (1985) ("[T]he prohibition against rape is to the marriage and sex 'market'
as the prohibition against theft is to explicit markets in goods and services.").
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would be unwise. What I say is not intended to provide a knock-down
argument proving that sex-by-deception cannot be criminalized. The goal
is only to remind us that sound reasons lie behind the judgment that
sex-by-deception isn't and shouldn't be a crime.
1. An Interesting Implication ofRape-by-Deception
Say that a man, twenty-five, invites a seventeen-year-old woman back to
his home, believing that she's eighteen. They have sex. What crimes have been
committed?
The man may well be guilty of statutory rape.17' But assuming that the girl
lied about her age and he wouldn't have slept with her otherwise, the girl
would also be guilty of rape -if sex-by-deception were rape. As a minor, would
she be immune from prosecution? On the contrary, minors are frequently
prosecuted as adults for rape."17 Hence man and girl might both serve time, he
for "statutorily" raping her, she for "really" raping him."
Until quite recently, judges could have warded off this double-rape result
by holding that women are legally incapable of raping men.' 7 But today's rape
law has rejected these notions."7 Women can be rapists, and they would be
much more often if sex-by-deception were rape.
Now consider a much more egregious case. A man - call him McDowell - sees
the following advertisement on Craigslist: "Need a real aggressive man with no
concern for women." A photograph shows the sender to be an attractive female
in her twenties. McDowell responds and receives by email a home address,
more photographs, and more statements of the following kind: "looking for
175. See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense
Model, 53 Am. U. L. REV. 313, 352 (2003) (discussing the rule that a "mistake-of age" is no
defense).
176. See, e.g., Armer v. State, 773 P.2d 757, 758-59 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Pentland, 719
P.2d 605, 6o6 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); see also, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (2010)
(providing for prosecution as adults of persons fourteen years of age or older charged with
rape).
177. See Christopher & Christopher, supra note 128, at 79 (arguing that sex by "adult
impersonation .. . constitutes rape by fraud").
178. See, e.g., State v. Greensweig, 644 P.2d 372, 375 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) ("Nature has provided
that only a male can accomplish the penetration by sexual intercourse."); Brooks v. State,
330 A.2d 670, 673 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
179. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 51o A.2d 1070, 1071 (Me. 1986); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,
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humiliation, physical abuse and sexual abuse." On a December afternoon in
2009, McDowell goes to the house, sees the woman, assaults her, ties her up,
and rapes her at knifepoint.
As the reader may know, these facts are real. The Craigslist advertiser
turned out to be an ex-boyfriend of the assaulted woman, one Jebidiah Stipe,
who, when the facts came out, was convicted of rape and sentenced to sixty
years in prison. "o A question much discussed was whether McDowell had also
committed rape: he claimed that he sincerely believed his victim had consented
and that he was merely fulfilling her sexual fantasies.S1 (The judge sentenced
him to sixty years as well.'"') A question no one asked was whether McDowell
had been the victim of rape.
But if sex-by-deception is rape, McDowell was raped, provided we accept
his story. The woman was raped by force. He was raped by fraud.
It is of course possible for a given individual simultaneously to commit a
crime and to be the victim of that crime (a person may steal and be stolen from,
kill and be killed, at the same time). The notion, however, that a man who
committed a violent sexual assault could himself claim rape on deception
grounds seems patently ridiculous. Yet that would be a perfectly predictable
result if sex-by-deception were rape.
And the assailant's putative rapist need not be a third party, as it was in
McDowell's case. It could be the victim of the assault herself. A man who only
rapes models could claim to have been raped by his victim if she falsely told
him she was a model. There's nothing logically incoherent in these
possibilities; a proponent of rape-by-deception could embrace them all. But
they strongly suggest that the whole idea of rape-by-deception has left
something out -that it misses something fundamental about what it means to
be raped.
2. The Merits ofDeceptive Sex
Now suppose we put aside the word "rape." Sex-by-deception need not be
iso. See Caroline Black, Ex-Marine Jebidiah James Stipe Gets 6o Years for Craigslist Rape Plot, CBS
NEws, June 29, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.conV8301- 5o 4 o8 3 _162-20009162-5O4o83.html.
181. See William Browning, 'Terribly Sorry': Craigslist Rapist Receives Same Sentence as Man Who
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called rape and could be subjected to lesser penalties.' Perhaps McDowell
was the victim of "sexual misconduct" or "sexual imposition"-or merely
"sex-by-deception." If we stop using the term rape, do we get a better case for
criminalizing sex-by-deception?
I don't think so. With respect to most crimes, it's hard to give a generally
favorable account of the behavior in question-hard to defend letting people
murder each other, steal each other's property, and so on. But deceptive sex,
however bad it may be, isn't that bad.
There's a reason the word romance is surrounded by a cloud of fictive
connotations. Few people know the whole truth about those with whom they
have sex, at least at first. Yes, we could have a legal regime of full disclosure
prior to any sexual contact -a kind of Rule 1ob-s for sexual security.184 This
would undoubtedly improve the rationality of sexual decisionmaking, but it
doesn't sound like fun. Rationality has no monopoly on sex.
And love? A vast engine of deception. Even in a hook-up culture, love floats
on the horizon, an obscure object of desire, and what is more common than
love's blinding one person to the most basic facts about another? If fully
informed consent were the key to lawful sex, the first thing we should do is jail
all the beautiful people.
It would be a gross exaggeration to say that everyone lies on the way to sex,
in the sense of verbally stating untruths. On the other hand, almost all of us
surely conceal; we rarely disclose every last bit of potentially relevant
information. And many of us-a great many, probably- tacitly mislead.
Clothing and underclothing can falsify. Make-up and hair dye can deceive. All
cosmetics misrepresent. They can designedly and quite effectively convey false
information concerning age, hair color, teeth, skin color or quality, bodily
characteristics, genetic predispositions, ethnicity, and so on. And just think of
cosmetic surgery. We may disapprove of some of these misrepresentations, but
on the whole it would seem a pity to see them all go. Many of us would
undoubtedly be in jail were every one of them criminal.
Certain lies told to obtain sex could be sensibly singled out by statute and
criminalized. Concealing a sexually transmissible disease would be a good
183. In Alabama, "sexual misconduct," a misdemeanor, includes sex by "fraud or artifice." ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2012); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-6 7 .4 (A)(i) (2004)
(defining "sexual battery," a misdemeanor, to include sexual touchings obtained by "ruse").
184. See 17 C.F.R. § 24o.1ob-5 (2012) (making it unlawful for any person to "make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact . . . in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security").
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example.' But it is hard to believe that all sex-by-deception could or should be
criminalized, under whatever name, even if the punishment were only a year or
two in jail.
B. The Myth ofSexual Autonomy
The permissibility of sex-by-deception throws a serious wrench into the
gears of American sex law. All the major components of sex law today have
seemingly converged on a single, unifying principle: sexual autonomy.
Sex-by-deception calls that principle into question. In this Section, I will argue
against the idea of a fundamental right to sexual autonomy, which, I will
suggest, is both unattainable and undesirable.
1. Sexual Autonomy's Unattainability
Autonomy is a big and loaded concept, with multiple possible meanings
across a variety of contexts. Speaking roughly, we can distinguish thick
accounts of autonomy from thin ones. Later I'll consider a thin version, but
sexual autonomy, at least as courts describe it, is thick -very thick.
Recall the Supreme Court's formulation: rape law protects an individual's
"privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be
established.18 6 Or the New Jersey Supreme Court's description of sexual
autonomy: the "right not only to decide whether to engage in sexual contact
with another, but also to control the circumstances and character of that
contact.""' We may feel we know what these sentences mean, but looking
squarely at what they say-who has ever enjoyed such rights and privileges?
Medieval kings are said to have claimed the right to sleep with any woman
they chose under the droit de seigneur. But only one person today imagines he
has the unfettered "privilege of choosing those with whom intimate
relationships are to be established" -a rapist. No one can hope to "control" all
"the circumstances and character" of his sexual activities. Why does sexual
autonomy find expression in a mythic language of unattainable rights?
The reason is twofold. First, autonomy is sometimes understood simply as
i8s. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5 (West 2011) (criminalizing sexual intercourse "without
the informed consent of the other person" by anyone infected with venereal disease or
HIV); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(a) (West 2012) (similar). But note that
this is already assault or battery. See infra note 227.
186. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
187. State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992).
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a synonym of freedom, so that complete sexual autonomy would indeed be a
freedom to act on all one's sexual desires (a freedom no one has ever had). But
there is a deeper current in the idea of sexual autonomy, which points to a
similarly unattainable ideal.
For many, sexual autonomy means sexual "self-determination'"8 : the
"fundamental right" to define and express one's "sexual identity."'5 ' In this
identitarian mode, the grail of sexual autonomy holds the heady liquors of
sexual fulfillment, emancipation, and self-realization. It promises liberation
from the invidious sexual pressures society imposes on us, whether repressive
and discriminatory, or over-sexualizing and objectifying.
But guaranteeing everyone a right to sexual "self-determination" is quite
impossible. First, one person's sexual self-determination will inevitably conflict
with others': John's will require that he sleep with Jane, but Jane's will require
otherwise. Second, the sexual self is heavily determined by forces beyond its
control: for most of us, the basic constituents of our sexuality are givens, not
choices. We broach here foundational problems in the theory of autonomy.
It's worth taking a moment to see how philosophy has sought to answer
them - and why those answers don't work for sexual autonomy.
Kant, arguably the most important philosopher in this tradition, had the
only perfect solution: he eliminated these intractable problems conceptually. In
Kant's thought, a person who acts on his desires, however freely and enjoyably,
has not achieved autonomy; on the contrary, he is a slave to his own passions.
Kantian autonomy is achieved only by a rational will that, transcending
appetite and ambition, follows reason's self-given laws, and reason demands
that agents act under universalizable rules (maxims that all could follow).'
Thus, conflicting individual autonomies are ruled out a priori. Our desires
invariably conflict; our autonomy never does. Moreover, a perfectly
autonomous agent is perfectly self-determining, because the self is here
conceived as a rational will giving itself law through reason alone.
Unfortunately, sexual autonomy defies this edifying solution. Sexual
,88. E.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 16-17; McGregor, supra note lo, at 236; Robert
Uerpmann-Wittzack, Personal Rights and the Prohibition of Discrimination, in EUROPEAN
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 67, 70 (Dirk Ehlers ed., 2007).
18g. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4, 9 (1995); Note, The Supreme Court,
1985 Term-Leading Cases, ioo HARv. L. REV. 100, 219 (1986) (referring to the "current
societal trend of recognizing that individuals have a fundamental right to define their own
sexual identities").
19o. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 56-57 (H.J. Patton
trans., Harper& Rowe 1964) (1785).
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autonomy, at least as we understand it today, is not Kantian autonomy. It's all
about desire -about exploring what you want and acting on your wants. What
we call "sexual autonomy" would have been for Kant a degrading contradiction
in terms. "Taken by itself [sex] is a degradation of human nature," says
Kant.' 9' "For the natural use that one sex makes of the other's sexual organs is
enjoyment . . . . In this act a human being makes himself into a thing, which
conflicts with the right of humanity in his own person." 92 On Kant's view,
"pure reason's laws of right"-and therefore autonomy-forbade sex altogether
except in (heterosexual) marriage.'" Needless to say, that's not what sexual
autonomy means today.
It is tempting to think that Kant's autonomy can be easily modernized,
stripped of obsolete moralities and updated with Freudian or other
contemporary insights into the centrality of sex to who we are. From this point
of view, a right protecting "the capacity to choose whether or how or with
whom one will have sexual relations" could be said to derive from the very
principle of autonomy that for Kant made sex dehumanizing. 94
But once autonomy takes bodily desire as constitutive, the problems noted
above reappear with a vengeance. One man's "capacity to choose whether or
how or with whom [he] will have sexual relations"1"9 will necessarily conflict
with others'. Some limit, therefore, must be imposed on sexual liberty. The
most common formulation is a "like and equal" principle: the sexual liberty
possessed by each must be compatible with-or in some formulations, it must
be the greatest possible sexual liberty compatible with-a like liberty for all.,16
Observe that the like-and-equal-liberty formula does not provide any
solution to the problem of how a self is supposed to determine itself when so
much of itself is beyond its control. On the contrary, by taking the capacity to
act on bodily desire as constitutive of self-determination, sexual autonomy
makes this problem quite unsolvable. But at least the like-and-equal formula is
supposed to adjudicate sexual conflicts in a way that delivers attractive results.
Regrettably, it fails to do so.
191. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 163 (Paul Mentzer ed., Louis Infield trans., 1963).
192. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 62 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
193. Id.
194. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEx, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAw: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OVERCRIMINALIZATION 54 (1982).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., id. at 117 (arguing that people should be "guaranteed the greatest equal liberty of
autonomous sexual expression compatible with a like liberty for all").
1419
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
After all, everyone could be given the right forcibly to impose their sexual
desires on whomever they can. In this sexual free-for-all, everyone would have
a perfectly like and equal liberty - indeed, the maximum possible like and equal
liberty. Yes, this maximal liberty would be unlike and unequal in the degree to
which different persons could exercise it; morally arbitrary qualities such as
strength would be favored. But the same is true of the more palatable solution
in which all are free to have sex with anyone who consents to it. Here, good
looks will be favored, not to mention wealth. Multiple equilibria satisfy the
like-and-equal formula, and the most expansive like-and-equal liberty would
be a freedom to rape.
Consider, therefore, one more, equally famous way of limiting liberty
under a principle of autonomy: the harm principle. This principle -that one
person's autonomy does not give him a right to harm anyone else -might
claim to deliver a clear prohibition of rape. But the harm principle is manifestly
inadequate as a solution to sexual autonomy's problems.
Paradigmatic exercises of sexual autonomy routinely do serious harm to
others. A's refusal to have sex with B can cause B acute suffering. Or A's
agreeing to have sex with B can cause even greater suffering in C, D, and E.
The idea that autonomy reaches its limit when its exercise harms another,
taken seriously, would make sexual autonomy impossible.
Someone will say that the harm of hurt feelings is not the right
kind of harm- not morally or legally cognizable. But this response is
question-begging. Psychological harms are real; they are legally recognized all
the time (pain, suffering, extreme emotional distress). More fundamentally, a
proponent of sexual self-realization is particularly ill-placed to dismiss these
harms. When A refuses B's sexual advances, A precisely does harm to B's
sexual self-determination. The notion that such refusals do no harm is simply
unavailable to a proponent of sexual self-determination as a fundamental right
or core human interest.
Individual autonomy first takes hold of Enlightenment philosophy as a
marriage of Christian morality and universal reason, in which the autonomous
self transcends its body, its earthly passions. On this heavenly plane, no man's
autonomy conflicts with anyone else's, and self-determination does not seek,
impossibly, to determine the self s desires, seeking instead to escape desire
altogether. But as modernity progresses, autonomy comes down from the
heavens and insists that the self to be realized is the chthonic self- the desiring,
preferring self. Reason now is no longer pure; it becomes instead the
instrumental rationality that calls on an agent not to act under universal laws,
but to maximize satisfaction of his preferences. Modern individual autonomy
becomes a battle waged on earthly terrain, fought out among real-world
persons with real-world desires.
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The irony and paradox is this: brought down from the heavens, sexual
self-determination becomes utterly mythical. We can neither determine our
own desires nor avoid the interpersonal clashes of desire that necessarily pit
one person's sexual autonomy against others'.
2. And Its Undesirability
But the problem with individual autonomy, as applied to sex, lies not only
in its demand for control over what cannot be controlled. Individual control is
simply the wrong demand. Indeed individuality itself is in a sense the wrong
demand.
No self can do without a boundary separating it from others. This
boundary presents itself to us first and foremost as physical in nature,
demarcated by our bodies. But autonomy and sexuality are situated very
differently with respect to this boundary. Autonomy jealously guards it, fearful
of every puncture or penetration. Sexuality, by contrast, desires nothing other
than this boundary's violation, both physically and psychologically.
Consider sexual love. Not all love is sexual, and not all sex is loving, but
love is undoubtedly an important dimension of human sexuality, and nothing
so bursts the confines of individual autonomy as love. Love dissolves the very
framework of individuation in which autonomy would operate. The other's
pain becomes our pain; the other's happiness our happiness; the other's fate
our fate. Love wants the other united with the self, and it wants the other to
want that same unity. In this way love desires a rupture -indeed it may effect a
rupture -in the boundary between self and other. That's why love, for Freud,
was so deep a threat to ego'97 and egoism a threat to love. Bodily integrity, on
which individual autonomy depends, is not love's ideal. On the contrary, the
disintegration ofindividuality is precisely what love desires.
Love and individual autonomy are in this respect strangers, speaking for
different sides of human nature, for different kinds of human
desire. Autonomy speaks for the ego, for control, for rationality and
self-determination. Love speaks for the self that wants irrationally or
a-rationally to break the ego's boundaries. It speaks on behalf of one self s
intermingling with another, with all the mystery and loss and gain that might
entail.
197. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITs DISCONTENTS (1930), in 21 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 64, 66 (James Strachey ed. & trans.,
1961) ("At the height of being in love, the boundary between ego and object threatens to
melt away.").
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But love is not necessary to make sexuality at odds with autonomy. Indeed
the case is almost stronger when sex is mixed with power or domination, rather
than or along with love. Those who find another's power sexually interesting
are very unlikely to be seeking, at least in any simple sense, their own
individual autonomy. They find satisfaction in surrender or submission.
As opposed to the "I" of pure reason, the desiring self is constituted by an
ineradicable other-directedness -by a desire, as Hegel suggests, not only for
another's body, but for something from the other's subjectivity, whether love,
fear, control, submission, or something else altogether.' Individual autonomy
is the last thing sexuality wants. From autonomy's point of view, sexuality is
undesirable. From sexuality's, autonomy is.
3. Sexual Autonomy as a Right Against Wrongful Conduct
But what about a much thinner concept of sexual autonomy? Suppose
autonomy has nothing to do with an agent's actual capacity to act on or realize
his will; suppose it requires only that he be free from the wrongful imposition
on him of anyone else's will.' Sexual autonomy would then eschew the rich
fulfillment of sexual emancipation and self-realization, insisting only on a right
against others' wrongful sexual impositions.
Unlike thick sexual autonomy, a right against sexual wrongs is not
unattainable. Some such right is indispensable. It underlies the crime of rape.
But autonomy is the wrong concept for this right. For one thing, do we
198. For Hegel, at least as Koj6ve famously read him, desire always desires the other's desire. See
ALEXANDRE KOJtVE, INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF HEGEL 6 (Allan Bloom ed., James
H. Nichols trans., 1980) ("[I]n the relationship between man and woman, for example,
Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other."); see also
11 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 235 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Alan Sheridan trans., 1981) ("Man's desire is
the desire of the Other."). But the desire desire desires is not primarily physical. The idea is
that human desire not only seeks pleasure from the other, but also needs something from
the other's consciousness. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT §5 175-76, at 11o
(A.V. Miller trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1807) ("Self-consciousness achieves its
satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.") (emphasis omitted). If so, there is
something in human sexual desire irreducible to, and longing to break from, individual self-
determination.
199. Ripstein has been particularly attentive to these difficulties. See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (2009) (articulating a
principle of "independence" along these lines and contrasting it with "more robust accounts




THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION AND THE MYTH OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY
really want to describe a homeless man without the use of his limbs, shunned
by society, kept alive by scraps of food thrown at him every now and then, as
perfectly autonomous-and in particular, as sexually autonomous? Thin
autonomy would have it so.oo In any event, thin autonomy can't be rape law's
principle for the simple reason that it can't distinguish between force and
fraud.
So long as wronging is understood in autonomy-based terms-as
the imposition of one person's sexual will on another without the latter's
consent- deception should be as wrongful as force.2 o'
Autonomy, whether thick or thin, can't be rape law's principle. It can't explain
why sex-by-deception differs from sex-by-force. Neither the like-and-equal
liberty principle nor the harm principle can solve this problem. The next Part
offers a principle that may do better.
V. FROM AUTONOMY TO SELF-POSSESSION
So: if we jettisoned autonomy as sex law's lodestar, what would the
consequences be?
To begin with, we'd have to acknowledge that American sex law is not so
unified after all. Cross-currents abound. Autonomy animates some sex
regulations, but not others-which is as it should be. Colleges, for example,
should be free to pursue norms of "informed consent" and "positive sexual
experiences" not reflected in criminal or constitutional sex law.
At the same time, new congruences might emerge. For example, consider
again the abolition of the crime of seduction, which, when defined to require a
false promise of marriage, was a form of sex-by-deception.20 2 Decriminalizing
seduction is not a legalization of consensual sex. Instead, it's closely tied to rape
law's refusal to punish sex-by-deception -and neither of these phenomena is
well understood in the language of sexual autonomy.
Prostitution laws furnish another example of a contemporary sex crime
potentially much better understood when the rhetoric of sexual autonomy is
stripped away. While prostitution laws can in theory be understood as
200. As a right solely against others' affirmative wrongs, thin autonomy is not measured by an
agent's actual "ability to get what he or she wants." Id. at 33. If thin autonomy were violated
by others' refusing to have relations with the agent, or increased the more the agent could
satisfy his desires, it would become thick autonomy, subject to all the difficulties discussed
above.
201. See, e.g., id. at 43-44, 128-29 (condemning force and fraud, both of which vitiate consent).
202. See supra notes 58 and 78.
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vindicating autonomy (on the ground that prostitutes lack free will), that
explanation has never been very strong.2o3 American sex law remains deeply
moralized. Exploding the myth of sexual autonomy may open up more
powerful insights explaining which sex crimes the twentieth century
decriminalized, and which it did not.
But by far the most profound consequence of jettisoning sexual autonomy
would be the conceptual vacuum it would create for rape law and the right to
privacy. How is rape to be defined if not as unconsented-to sex? Can Lawrence
be saved if there is no such thing as a fundamental right to sexual
self-determination? This final Part tries to answer these questions.
A. Sexual Autonomy's Irrelevance to Rape Law
We might think that modern rape law must protect sexual autonomy. Isn't
every rape a violation of autonomy? What else could rape law possibly protect
once female virtue is taken out of the equation?
In fact, sexual autonomy is a red herring when it comes to rape. Seeing why
will point the way to an alternative principle. Imagine two friends debating
whether individuals have a fundamental right of "smoking autonomy"
(meaning something like a right to smoke if and as one chooses). John, a cigar
smoker, claims there is such a right. Jane, a nonsmoker, denies it. John says
smoking is central to and expressive of his identity; Jane says no one has a right
to inflict on others unpleasant and perhaps harmful smoke. In a subtle parry of
Jane's nuanced logic, John physically forces her to smoke the cigar against her
will.
Now: are we obliged to say that Jane was wrong- that there is a right of
203. While forced prostitution and crimes against prostitutes are sickeningly common, see
Margaret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47, 87 (1992) (describing prostitutes as "rapable, beatable, killable"), if
sexual autonomy were a fundamental, constitutional right, the mere fact of selling sex for
money could not be taken as a surrender of autonomy sufficient to sustain a categorical ban
on prostitution any more than selling stories for money indicates a surrender of autonomy
sufficient to sustain a ban on for-profit fiction or journalism. Instead, the idea of sexual
autonomy as a fundamental right implies that prostitution should be constitutionally
protected. See, e.g., RICHARDs, supra note 194, at 84-127 (arguing that autonomy, properly
understood, argues in favor of a right to prostitution); Gowri Ramachandran, Against the
Right to Bodily Integrity: Of Cyborgs and Human Rights, 87 DENv. U. L. REV. 1, 53 (2009)
("[I]t is arguable that not only should we abandon the claim that prostitution violates
fundamental rights to bodily integrity, but we should also recognize a fundamental right to
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"smoking autonomy" -in order to conclude that she had a right not to have a
cigar stuffed into her mouth? I don't think so. What makes John's act wrongful
has nothing to do with whether it violated Jane's supposed right of "smoking
autonomy" -a concept we might want to reject altogether. In other words,
"smoking autonomy" is wholly irrelevant to the wrongness of John's act.
So too with "sexual autonomy" and rape. No one needs to believe in
"sexual autonomy" to be against rape. Sexual autonomy is irrelevant to rape law.
Autonomy is the sort of thing that's "infringed." Rape is not a mere
"infringement." We might as well explain torture as an infringement of the
victim's "bodily autonomy" -his right to do what he likes with his own body.
Some evils go beyond the infringement of autonomy. Their wrongfulness and
harm cannot be captured in terms of nonconsent, even though consent will
typically be lacking.
B. Rape as a Violation of Self-Possession
There is a simple lesson in the case of the cigar. A difference exists between
an autonomy right to engage in an activity if, as, or when you please, and a
right not to have that activity affirmatively pressed on you against your will.
What is the nature of the latter right?
There is no universal right against being forced into activity against your
will. You can be made to pay taxes. When can people have actions forced on
them, and when can't they?
It might be tempting to invoke Kant again and to say that forcing an
activity onto someone is wrongful when it uses them-or treats them as an
object, or merely as a means. But such formulations, while frequently advanced
in connection with rape,2 o4 cannot serve rape law's purposes. Lying uses people
too. And if a wife rolls her sleeping husband over to stop the dog from leaping
onto the bed, she may treat him solely as a means and an object, but her act
involves no serious wrong -nothing remotely comparable to rape.
The key concept, then, for rape law, is not objectification. Rather, I will
suggest, it is self-possession.
By self-possession, I don't mean perfect self-control or composure.
I'm referring to a self-possession far more basic-and more physical.
Self-possession, as I will use the phrase, refers to the possession of one's own
body.
204. See, e.g., John Gardner & S. Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE, FOURTH SERIES 193 (J. Horder ed., 2000).
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In rape, to state the obvious, something unusual is done to a person's body.
A rape victim's body is taken over, invaded, occupied, taken control of- taken
possession of- in a fashion and to a degree not present in ordinary acts of theft,
robbery, assault, and so on. The fact that the rapist uses the victim's body for
sex is central here -violent sex, especially penetrative sex, forced on a victim
against her will, is a taking of the body, a possessory act-but forcing sex on
people is not the only way to take possession of their bodies. Rape is only one
of several crimes that violate what might be called an individual's right to self-
possession.
This Article is not the place for a full discussion of this right. In brief,
however, self-possession is not a property right. You don't own your body the
same way you own a car. Rather, bodily possession is a matter (like most forms
of possession) of physical control. While no one fully controls his body- our
mastery of our bodies is partial in a thousand ways and absent in a thousand
more-almost all of us enjoy a basic integration of mind and body that gives us
an irreducible measure of physical governance over our bodies and makes our
bodies our own. Although normally taken so for granted that we are not even
aware of it, this bodily self-possession is central to our selfhood and intimately
connected to dignity."os
Dignity, however, is possessed in degrees; it's something you can have
more or less of. By contrast, self-possession is (again, like most forms of
possession) binary; you either have it or you don't. It's not easy to be
dispossessed of your body (just as it isn't easy to be dispossessed of a house in
which you remain an occupant). You lose self-possession not when another
person merely wounds, embarrasses or constrains you, but when the other
actually takes over your body -exercising such complete and invasive physical
control over it that your body is in an elemental sense no longer your own.
The best way to explain how self-possession can be violated is to observe
two acts that paradigmatically do so: enslavement and torture. In both slavery
205. For an interesting treatment connecting self-possession and dignity, see GEORGE KATEB,
HUMAN DIGNITY 164-69 (2011). Waldron has also made this connection. See Jeremy
Waldron, Dignity, Rights and Responsibilities, 43 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1107, 1126-27 (2012).
Self-possession -and especially a woman's right to it-has occasionally been cited as an
important interest protected by rape law. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A
Legal Histoty of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1413-14, 1421-22 (2000); Larson, supra
note 58, at 425-26. But in these discussions, the word is sometimes used as a synonym of
self-determination or self-expression, a meaning substantially different from what I have in
mind. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 58, at 425 (defining "sexual self-possession" in terms of "a
person's interest in sexual self-expression through acts and with partners that satisfy her
present desires and purposes").
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and torture, another individual becomes master of the victim's body. With
slavery, this mastery consists of a power to force the victim wholly and bodily
to serve the other: to please the other, to be occupied with any task he
commands, to exist for his purposes and his satisfaction. With torture, mastery
consists of a power to inflict on the victim such excruciating pain, suffering, or
terror that the victim's own bodily self-governance is nullified and sundered.
In both cases, the victim's body becomes-not metaphorically, but physically
and actually -someone else's possession.
The same is true of rape. In fact, on this dimension, rape is very close to
both slavery and torture. Like slaves, rape victims are made bodily to serve
another's pleasure-to exist, if briefly, only for his satisfaction. Like many
torture victims, rape victims' bodies are immobilized, penetrated, exposed to
wanton bodily cruelty or death, and their extreme pain and fear is often part of
what the perpetrator seeks to achieve. Rape may not in every case be an act of
enslavement,2 and not every act of rape literally involves torture,2 o' but the
similarities are unmistakable. It is no coincidence that when women are
enslaved or tortured, sexual abuse is the norm.
Rape, we might say, is poised halfway between slavery and torture,
sometimes more like the one, sometimes more like the other, always sharing
core elements with each. In particular, rape shares with slavery and torture the
same fundamental violation. The victim's body is utterly wrested from her
control, mastered, possessed by another.20
Suppose, then, that we thought of rape as a violation of self-possession, on
a par with slavery and torture. How might this view help solve rape law's core
problems?
206. But cf Jane Kim, Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery, 35 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 263 (2012)
(arguing that all rape should be considered a form of slavery).
207. Needless to say, many rapes do involve torture. See, e.g., John Eligon, Prosecutor Details Rape
That Lasted 19 Hours, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.coni/2oo8
/o6/o6/nyregion/o6rape.html (describing the ordeal of a Columbia University graduate
student whose lips were glued together and body burned during her extended rape).
208. Because I have described the right to self-possession primarily by reference to paradigmatic
or core violations, I've said very little about cases lying more toward the periphery of the
concept (Is kidnapping a violation of self-possession? What about someone forced to
smoke a cigar against her will?). In this Article, my hope is only to have provided a working
idea of the right to self-possession; if the core cases are clear, that is enough for present
purposes. I hope in future work to develop a fuller account of the right to self-possession
and its connection to dignity.
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C. Rape Law's Core Problem Revisited
Every attempt to say what distinguishes rape from other assaults has a
complex problem or dilemma to solve. On the one hand, it has to be adequate
phenomenologically, not merely philosophically, capturing in some way the
acute experience of violation rape victims may actually feel. On the other, it has
to avoid the opposite trap - that of exaggerating or presupposing rape's
ruinous effect, thereby falling back into old moralities of sexual defilement.
Seeing rape as a violation of self-possession offers a way to cut this Gordian
knot.
Consider the following story:
In 1974, when Ms. Xenarios was 28 and working as a city social
worker, she was raped on a sunless day on a rooftop in Harlem.
It was just before Thanksgiving-she has blotted the exact date
from her memory-and she was about to interview someone in the
urgent case of a baby missing from Harlem Hospital Center. She said a
man grabbed her in the stairwell of an apartment building and held a
knife the size of a switchblade to her neck.
Fevered, frantic and spitting racial insults, the man forced Ms.
Xenarios, who is white, to the rooftop. She did not scream but said to
him, "You really don't want to do this . . ." The man said he was going
to throw her off the roof. He raped her.
Without explanation, the man let her live. He fled. Ms. Xenarios
walked unsteadily down the stairwell and attended a previously
scheduled social-work meeting at the Harlem hospital. At mid-meeting,
she collapsed in grief and torment.20
These facts can barely be distinguished from thousands of other rapes
suffered by thousands of other women. Given the prevalence of rape in our
society, the case might not even seem shocking. What happened to Ms.
Xenarios did not prompt a congressional hearingo - but it was more than
enough. The story continues:
She was immediately taken to the emergency room. One thing she
209. Anthony Ramirez, Firsthand Experience of Rape, and Resiliency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2o7/2/28/nyregion/281ives.html.
21o. Contra Chris McGreal, Rape Case To Force US Defence Firms into the Open,
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remembers is a doctor and a police detective interviewing her as she lay
exposed from the waist down for a gynecological examination. The
man was never caught.
She told her new husband, Giorgos Xenarios, a Greek painter she
had met after living in Greece, about the rape. "A lot of my energy was
focused on helping him with this because there's enormous shame and
losing face" attached to the husband of a rape victim in Mediterranean
culture, she said.2"
Why tell this story? To get at the root of modern rape law's problem.
Here is one reading of Ms. Xenarios's story. Her husband's "shame" is
inexcusable: how dare he feel that his wife, being raped, is now a source of
shame to him? The police detective's indifference is also inexcusable, as he
subjects the raped woman to a visual violation - interrogating her even as she
lies exposed and naked -grotesquely similar to the physical violation she has
just endured. Only the woman's reaction, her "grief and torment," is right and
justified and deserving-and all the worse because she has to suffer it alone.
But here is another reading. The woman's grief and torment are as
unjustified as the husband's shame. In fact her reaction is little different from
his. Both react as if she's been "ruined" and "defiled," as if the rapist succeeded
in inflicting permanent and fundamental damage to her soul just by virtue of
inserting one part of his body into hers. Both reactions are the residue of that
obsolete moral worldview in which sex ruined a woman, took away her virtue,
made a whore of her. Ironically, on this view, only the detective's reaction - his
indifference to her psychic injury and nakedness - is right and justified.
This second reading -not one I accept, but one that requires a response -
returns us at last to modern rape law's core problem. If today we see in rape
something different from and worse than most other assaults, do we invest
rape with the disgrace, the shame, the power to ruin, that the old law used to
attribute to it?
Feminists have been of two minds on this question for a long time. On the
one hand, there is the need to credit rape victims' own experience of the crime,
to appreciate the seriousness of rape's harm and psychological impact, to speak
out against its outrageousness.' On the other, there is an equally feminist
211. Ramirez, supra note 209.
212. See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 17, at 1-15.
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impulse not to oversell rape's violation, as if every rape "murders" a woman's
"soul" or inflicts an irreparable injury redefining its victim for the rest of her
life.213
Both inclinations are understandable. And both are necessary; either
without the other is one-sided. Doubtless the horror attaching to rape
in contemporary culture still reflects a measure of the old defilement
moralities."1 But the idea that there is no distinctive violation inflicted by
rape whatever-that it is just another assault, like being punched in the
stomach - goes too far in the other ideological direction. Sex is not specially
central to virtue or self-definition in the way the old moralizers or the new
identitarians both suppose. But forcing sex on someone against her will is a
special kind of harm. The concept of self-possession helps explain why.
Rape victims suffer, against their will, the condition of belonging bodily to
someone else, of having their bodies possessed by someone else. Rape victims
are forced to submit their bodies to the rapist to serve his gratification.
Their own helplessness, fear, and pain may themselves be a cause of
pleasure to him.21s Like slavery and torture, rape is not "moral ruin" or
"soul-murder" -ideas that impute to the rapist a moral power he doesn't wield
and to rape an irreparable damage it needn't do. But for however short a time,
rape victims are no longer their own person-a condition vital to selfhood. It
would not be surprising if rape victims felt this brutal loss of self-possession.
There are worse things in the world than rape, but it may not, after all, be
so far off to see in rape an "ultimate violation of self.""' The loss of
self-possession explains why rape is different from other assaults, and it does
so without dependence on sex-defilement moralities.
213. See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY To TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM
345 (20o6) (asking whether "the politics of injury and of traumatized sensibility" might be
"helping to authorize and enable women as sufferers").
214. This is particularly obvious in the case of male rape-horror, which, as expressed in
contemporary American culture, barely bothers to disguise its fraternity with the view that
male homosexuality is disgusting or contaminating or feminizing.
215. See, e.g., LES SUSSMAN & SALLY BORDWELL, THE RAPIST FILE: INTERVIEWS WITH CONVICTED
RAPISTS 32-33 (2000) (quoting convicted rapists) ("What I really enjoyed was when I tied
them down.... The pain part of it was the best part."); id. at 213 ("This time my excitement
was at a peak because this young girl, who wasn't more than 17, was actually trembling with
fright. . . . I used to threaten murder, slicing their throats with a knife I produced, which
was the best, it excited me to see the fright and sheer dominance I had over each and every
one of them.").
216. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (quoting LISA BRODYAGA ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS,
HEALTH FACILITIES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 1 (1975)).
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D. Self-Possession and the Right to Privacy
Shifting rape law's focus from autonomy to self-possession would actually
put rape law into a profound congruence with the right to privacy. In earlier
work, I have suggested that the constitutional right to privacy for which Roe v.
Wade stands was never well understood as a right to self-determination or
self-definition, but has always been much closer to a right against being
instrumentalized in a particularly totalizing way-a right against being forced
into state-dictated service.2"
The argument for a forced-servitude reading of Roe is simple. A law
banning abortion forces a pregnant woman into motherhood against her will.
It conscripts her for as much as nine months (and arguably much longer) into
a particular, life-occupying role."' The principle it violates is the same one that
would forbid a state from dictating to people their occupations -not because
the law violates a right to self-definition, but because it violates the right not
to be forced into state-dictated service against one's will. A great deal of
right-to-privacy case law fits within this principle."' And this principle is
closely connected to the right of self-possession; the body of a woman denied
an abortion is also taken over and occupied against her will.
Where does this leave Lawrence? It depends on how we read that case.
If Lawrence is read as a pure sexual-autonomy case, then according to the
arguments laid out above, Lawrence is wrong. There is no constitutional right
to sexual autonomy. Or again, if Lawrence is taken as a pure libertarian
decision- holding that states cannot criminalize homosexuality because "the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice"2o- then Lawrence is also wrong. The Constitution does not enact
Atlas Shrugged any more than it enacts Social Statics.
But equality and invidious discrimination were also in play in Lawrence -very
obviously so."' If Lawrence comes to stand for an equality principle, then
217. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 223-27, 248-53 (2001).
218. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 243 (1985) (describing the prohibition
of abortion as "conscript[ing] women ... as involuntary incubators").
z2g. See RUBENFELD, supra note 217, at 221-55.
220. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, S77 (2003) (quoting approvingly Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
221. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concurring on equal protection
grounds). To be sure, antihomosexuality laws, at least in the past, were aimed at forcing
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nothing I have said counts against it. Readers who believe that states cannot
constitutionally criminalize consensual sex should have a serious problem with
the account of privacy being offered here. (Of course they should also have a
problem with laws prohibiting prostitution, incest among adults, and public
sexuality.') But readers who believe that Lawrence can be defended on equal
protection grounds should not.
Whatever the fate of Lawrence, we are now in a position to return to rape
law. If rape is seen as a violation of self-possession, comparable to slavery and
torture, then a new understanding of rape law, with concrete implications for
rape doctrine, comes into view.
E. Self-Possession and Force
To begin with, return to the problem of deception. When rape law takes
autonomy as its central value, and rape is compared to trespass, theft, or other
consent-based crimes, the exclusion of deception (as a means of committing
the crime) seems like a riddle, an unjustifiable exception. But this
exceptionality disappears when rape is instead laid alongside slavery and
torture.
"Slavery-by-deception" is no more slavery than rape-by-deception is rape.
Imagine a person working at manual labor sixteen hours a day because he was
lied to about how much money he will be paid or what sort of project he is
contributing to. He is the victim of fraud, not slavery. Similarly, a person made
to confess on the rack is tortured, but a person made to confess through a ruse
in which his interrogator masquerades as a confederate is not.
Slavery, torture, and rape all resist deception in precisely the same way
because they are all crimes against self-possession. A fraud victim retains
his basic bodily self-governance. He is manipulated, but his person-
elementally, physically- remains his own. Fraud is an offense against
autonomy, not self-possession.
Now consider the force requirement. Once again, held up against the
individuals into specific, state-dictated heterosexual relationships. Hence, such laws in the
past could have been said to violate the antitotalitarian right I have ascribed to Roe. To the
extent that such laws continued to bear their past purpose, they still could.
222. If consensual sex were genuinely constitutionally protected on autonomy grounds, engaging
in it for profit should not be prohibitable -just as for-profit religious practices or novels
can't be proscribed. See supra note 203. Similarly, regardless of the possibility of genetic
abnormalities, prohibiting all incest among adults would seem plainly unjustifiable, and as
to public sexuality, states might legitimately seek to protect children from exposure, but a
complete ban would again seem plainly overbroad.
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standard of autonomy and juxtaposed with trespass, theft, and so on, rape
law's force requirement seems perplexing and anomalous. But placed next to
the law of slavery and torture, rape's force requirement is wholly
unexceptional.
Thirteenth Amendment doctrine, for example, has a force requirement very
similar to that of rape law. As the Supreme Court has put it, reconfirming a
long line of precedent, the "Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary
servitude" applies only to servitude "enforced by the use or threatened use of
physical or legal coercion. The guarantee of freedom from involuntary
servitude has never been interpreted specifically to prohibit compulsion of
labor by other means, such as psychological coercion.""'
The Thirteenth Amendment's force requirement is no accident. It conforms
with our basic understanding of what slavery is-and with the right to
self-possession. If the only power a master held over his slaves was the power
to fire them from their labor, his slaves would not be slaves. They would be
employees. It's precisely this bodily freedom to walk away from a job that (at
least in principle) leaves the employee a free man, self-possessed. Out of work,
he may be poorer, but he will retain the basic governance over his own body
that self-possession requires. That's the sense, for better or worse, in which all
employees (as opposed to slaves) remain fundamentally their own persons.
But if the master makes his employees continue at their labor by chaining
and whipping them, they are no longer employees. They are slaves, and the
reason is that no self-possession now remains open to them. Their bodies are
no longer their own. If they don't "voluntarily" submit to bodily servitude,
they will be physically incapacitated and beaten until they do submit (or until
they're dead).
Torture is similar. Under federal law, torture is the intentional infliction
(or attempted infliction) of "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" on a
person in the "custody or physical control" of the torturer.2m Inflicting physical
pain is an obvious act of force, and "mental pain or suffering" is further defined
to cover exactly four situations that also involve force (including threats of
223. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988); see Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,
240-45 (1911); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 566 (4 th Cir. 1981) (concluding that
slavery or involuntary servitude exists where "control over [individuals'] lives" is
"maintained through the threat of criminal sanctions . . . or through physical force"
(citations omitted)); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 481-85 (2d Cir. 1964). This
understanding may depart from international law, which defines slavery in terms not of
forced service, but of the existence of legal incidents of ownership. See Slavery Convention
art. 1(i), Sept. 25, 1926, 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (as amended in 1953).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 234o(1) (20o6).
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force).22 s International law may be more receptive to claims of purely
psychological torture, but the kinds of acts envisioned by those who champion
a broader definition of psychological torture-for example, prolonged
isolation, gross sleep deprivation, placing a victim in a box with animals that
terrify him-involve at a minimum custody, imprisonment, and incapacitation,
which are all acts of force."'
Thus does the right of self-possession offer rape law what it has always
lacked: a legal and theoretical framework in which the force requirement finds
its proper place and explanation. As with slavery and torture, so with rape:
when law protects the fundamental right of self-possession, it demands bodily
force. The simple reason is that the violation of this right consists in another
person mastering and taking possession of the victim's body, wresting away
the victim's elemental control over her own person, and where there is no
force, there is no such mastery or taking.
F. An Objection: Self-Possession a Floor, Not a Ceiling
"You haven't provided a justification for the force requirement at all," it
might be said. "You seem to have forgotten something obvious. Nonviolent
sexual predation may not be a loss of self-possession in your sense, but states
can still criminalize it. Rape law is free to prohibit more than the bare
minimum."
This objection is of course correct. States are perfectly free to criminalize
forms of sexual imposition other than forcible rape. Nevertheless, once we see
that violent rape violates a fundamental right - the right to self-possession - we
can finally explain the distinction, which our law systematically tracks yet can't
account for, between sex violently forced on a person against her will,
which is invariably recognized as rape, and non-forcible sex, including
sex-by-deception, which is not. States may criminalize all sex-by-deception if
they choose, but violent rape violates fundamental rights in a way that sexual
deception doesn't, offering a justification to states that choose to stick to the
force requirement.
225. The term is defined as "prolonged mental harm caused by" (i) the intentional infliction of
severe physical pain; (2) the administration of "mind-altering substances"; (3) the threat of
imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will be imminently subjected to any
of these things. Id. § 2340(2).
226. See, e.g., David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique ofErasures in U.S. Law, ioo
GEO. L.J. 823, 836-37 (2012).
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G. Doctrine
In this last Section, I'll spell out a few doctrinal implications of rape as
a violation of self-possession. This view makes many problematic cases
easy-deception cases, for example." But I won't discuss easy cases here.
Instead I will take up some harder issues. My purpose is not to show that a
self-possession view of rape eliminates all difficulties (it doesn't), but to test
the limits of this view, to see what light it sheds on controversial issues, and to
acknowledge that it will sometimes lead to uncomfortable results.
1. Defining Force
"Force" is hardly self-defining. Psychological forces could be included; so
could pecuniary forces. Anything that results in coercion, it might said, should
count as force. For example, shouldn't a high school principal who threatened
to expel a seventeen-year-old student unless she had sex with him be found to
have used force for rape law's purposes?
An understanding of rape as a violation of self-possession says no. This
result conforms with existing law in some states." it will not, however,
conform with many readers' intuitions.
But a coercion rule for rape law is pretty difficult to sustain. To begin
with, as seen earlier, coercion-based theories of rape run headlong into the
rape-by-deception problem. Coercion matters because it renders the victim's
consent not genuine, meaningful, or valid. But as we know, the same logic
applies to deception. If all coerced sex is rape, all unconsented-to sex ought to
be rape, including rape-by-deception.
227. Sex-by-deception, without more, would never be rape on a right-to-self-possession view.
Needless to say, egregious acts of sexual deception-for example, lying about a sexually
transmissible disease or perhaps even impersonating a spouse-could be independently
criminalized, see supra note 185, or they could amount to battery. See, e.g., Leleux v. United
States, 178 F.3d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]here an individual fraudulently conceals the
risk of sexually transmitting a disease, that action vitiates the partner's consent and
transforms consensual intercourse into battery . . . ."); Boyett v. State, 159 So. 2d 628,
630-31 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964) (affirming the assault conviction of a man who posed as a
doctor to examine a woman); R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (Can.) (reaching a similar
conclusion to that reached in Leleux).
228. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990) (holding that a high school
principal who coerced sex from a student by threatening not to allow her to graduate could
not be convicted of sexual intercourse without consent, absent evidence that he threatened
her with imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping).
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Moreover, imagine a young woman who threatens to break up with her
boyfriend unless he violates his religious ban on sex until marriage. Breaking
up would devastate him, so he sleeps with her. Nearly everyone will say the
boy wasn't raped, but he was coerced, wasn't he? He was made to have sex
through a threat with devastating consequences. 9
Neither coercion nor consent has ever been able to explain why sex induced
by deception, by a threat to break off a relationship, or by any other nonviolent
undermining of autonomy isn't rape. Self-possession can. Only sex coerced
through bodily violence wrests from the victim her fundamental bodily
self-possession-and is therefore rape.
Return now to the notorious Mlinarich case,23o in which a fourteen-year-old
girl submitted sexually to her guardian because he had threatened to send her
back to juvenile detention. The judges who overturned Mlinarich's rape
conviction evidently believed that imprisonment did not amount to the kind of
force required for rape" -an idea that goes a long way back in rape law.3
Rape as a violation of self-possession rejects this holding, and the comparison
to torture and slavery is helpful here. Imprisonment, as noted in the case of
torture, is itself an act of physical force; moreover, imprisonment was among
the forms of violence notoriously and characteristically directed at slaves.
Keeping laborers at work through a threat of imprisonment turns employment
into slavery. Sodomizing a girl through the same threat turns sex into rape.
As a general rule, we might say that sex is rape whenever exacted through
the kind of force that turns labor into slavery: roughly speaking, physical
incapacitation, whether through restraint or imprisonment, or serious physical
assault (or the threat of either). Absent such force, sex under conditions of
power imbalance, material want, or psychological pressure isn't rape. If it were,
sex would very frequently- perhaps ordinarily - be a criminal offense.
229. But cf WERTHEIMER, supra note 81, at 174 (suggesting that threats are coercive only when
they "propose to violate [someone's] rights"). This test is puzzling. That a threat was lawful
for the threatener doesn't make it less coercive for the threatened. In any event, odd results
follow. For example, in Mlinarich, where the defendant induced a 14-year-old girl to have
sex with him by threatening to return her to a juvenile prison, apparently the defendant
did not commit rape, provided that he had the legal right to return her to prison (which he
may well have had).
230. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
231. See id. at 1342.
232. See, e.g., People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374 (1874) (reversing a rape conviction where the
defendant had locked a fourteen-year-old girl in a barn).
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2. Masochism, Wantedness, and Mistake
Historically, rape law has understood consent as a mental state, a state of
wanting or desire, so that judges often disregarded what women said, asking
instead if they were inwardly "willing.""' Thus were rape victims frequently
put on trial, with defense counsel probing their sexual past, and defendants
exonerated by raising a doubt about whether the complainant "wanted it."
Rape as a violation of self-possession offers a clear improvement. Whether
the complainant wanted or consented to sex is a question that sounds in sexual
autonomy, not self-possession. Rape as a violation of self-possession doesn't ask
whether the victim wanted or consented to sex. It asks instead whether the victim
consented to the violence to which she was subjected, and this consent refers to a
communicated permission, not a mental state of desire or willingness."
In this way, rape as a violation of self-possession also offers a simple
approach to sadomasochistic sex. Ascertaining consent to sex in
sadomasochism can be problematic. Yes, "safe words" can be employed, but
maybe the parties don't play the game that way. Perhaps some people precisely
want their sexual refusal to be overridden. In any event, if the question is
whether each person currently consents to each sex act engaged in, the answer
can be difficult to determine when one of the parties is gagged and bound.
Rape as a violation of self-possession would ask whether the violence was
consented to. Does this place a special burden on sadomasochistic sex,
requiring an affirmative grant of permission (by word or conduct) for any
violence used? Yes. People had better get each other's permission before
binding, gagging, whipping, and so on. If they do not, they commit rape. On
the other hand, if a person does consent to be bound and gagged, then decides
233. E.g., Whittaker v. State, 7 N.W. 431, 432 (Wis. 188o) ("Consenting is to be willing, as a
condition of the mind."). Traditional-era judges expressed acute concern about men who
had sex with women who outwardly said no to sex while actually "burning" for it. E.g.,
Jones v. State, 16 S.E. 380, 383 (Ga. 1892) (warning of the "charming woman,... wishing
beyond adequate expression what she must not even attempt to express, and seemingly
resisting what she burns to enjoy" (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). In essence,
traditional judges asked whether the woman's body was saying yes -the most egregious
example of which was the ancient rule that pregnancy barred a claim of rape. See, e.g., 18
CHARLEs VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 153 (London, G.G.J. et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1793) ("If the feme at the time of the supposed rape conceives with child by the
ravisher, this is no rape; for no woman can conceive, unless she consents." (emphasis
omitted)).
234. See, e.g., JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE?: ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING WOMEN'S
CONSENT SERIOUSLY 117 (2005) ("There are two major accounts of the nature of consent: the
attitudinal and the performative.").
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later that he does not want sex after all, but can no longer express it, he has not
been raped-because he consented to the violence, even if he ends up
(arguably) subject to unconsented-to sex.
Consent to violence is not as subject to mistake as is consent to sex.
Whether a person wanted sex may be easily put in question; whether a person
affirmatively gave her permission to be bound, cut, whipped, threatened, and
so on, is more difficult to make an issue of. To be sure, mistake cases would
still arise. In particular, there will always be cases in which one person fears
violence (or says so) but the other intended no threat (or says so).
The only question in such a case should be whether the person claiming
rape reasonably believed the other's words or actions communicated a threat of
serious violence if she refused to sexually submit. It makes no difference
whether the perpetrator believed his victim wanted sex with him, or whether in
fact he intended no harm. A man who knowingly uses words or actions
reasonably likely to induce a fear of violence, and then procures sex as a
consequence, does so at his peril.
3. No Means No - but It May Not Mean Rape
What about sex in the face of a "no"? The appealing position here is
categorical: sex in the face of a clearly articulated "no" is always rape.
Unappealingly, rape as a violation of self-possession would not be able to take
this position. This point will probably be reason enough for many readers to
reject the entire argument made so far. Unfortunately, I see no way out.
According to some reports, women frequently have sex after first saying
"no.""' If men force this sex on women through violence, they of course
commit rape. Or if they put the woman in fear of violence, they also commit
rape. Often, then, a force requirement will be satisfied in such cases. But not
always.
The issue is not hypothetical. In a well-known case called Berkowitz, a rape
235. Deception could vitiate consent to sadomasochistic violence (perhaps counterintuitively, the
argument presented thus far is agnostic on this point), but it seems plausible that at least
some material deception should not be held to do so-because the goal is not sexual
autonomy.
236. A 1988 survey found that over thirty-nine percent of undergraduate women at a Texas
university had pretended not to want sex they actually wanted before having it. See, e.g.,
Charlene L. Muchlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They
Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women's Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 872 (1988).
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conviction was reversed where an undergraduate male had pressed forward
with sexual activity, culminating in intercourse, even as his female classmate
repeatedly "moaned" "no"; there was no allegation of violence or threatened
violence in the case, the door to the room was unlocked, and the woman knew
it was unlocked, so that she would have been free to leave at any time prior to
intercourse.2 7 Many find Berkowitz deeply offensive.23 But depending on the
facts, rape as a violation of self-possession could accept this outcome. The
point is not that the victim failed to resist, that her "no" meant yes, or that the
defendant might have so believed. The point is simply that where there is
neither violence nor fear of violence, where the victim could have walked away
at any moment, there has been no violation of self-possession.
The claim that a "no" meant yes belongs to the vocabulary of sexual
consent. It tries to establish that sex was wanted. As I have said, rape as a
violation of self-possession does not ask that question. It asks whether the
victim was forced into sexual submission, and the fact that sex took place while
a person was saying "no" doesn't prove force. People are quite capable of
voluntarily taking an action, or voluntarily participating in it, even as they
say-and mean- "no."239
237. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
238. See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 741 (2010) (describing reactions to the
case). Some claim that women frequently "freeze" in response to unwanted sexual advances.
See, e.g., Jennifer J. Freyd, What juries Don't Know: Dissemination of Research on Victim
Response Is Essential for Justice, TRAUMA PSYCHOL. NEWSL. (Div. 56, Am. Psychological Ass'n,
Washington, D.C.), Fall 2008, at 16 (claiming that studies show that many women in these
circumstances fall into a "tonic immobility" characterized by "dissociation" and "paralysis"
(citation omitted)); see also People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 1o, 118 (Cal. 1986) (en banc)
("[M] any women demonstrate 'psychological infantilism' . . . in the face of sexual assault."
(citation omitted)). I would proceed with extreme caution before accepting these claims of
women's "infantilism." See Vivian Berger, Not So Simple Rape, 7 CluM. JUST. ETHICS 69, 76
(1988) (reviewing ESTRICH, supra note 17) ("[O]verprotection risks enfeebling instead of
empowering women . . . ."). But note that this reaction is said to be a response to "assault,"
Barnes, 721 P.2d at u8; Freyd, supra, at 16, and if there has been an assault, then of course
the force requirement is satisfied.
239. Although not on a par with sex, someone might say "no," for example, while allowing
himself to be seated on a roller coaster or while jumping with friends off a high rock into a
river. This "no" need not mean yes. It could mean that the speaker has intensely mixed
feelings or that what he is doing conflicts with his better judgment. Such a "no" can also
express a sincere wish, request, or even command that another stop what he's doing even
though if the other doesn't stop, the speaker knows he will then choose to go forward too, as
when someone says "no" or "don't" or "please stop" as someone serves him dessert -then
eats the dessert. Again, the example is obviously not comparable to sex; it serves simply to
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Accordingly, absent physical restraint, overpowering, violence, or the threat
of violence, rape as a violation of self-possession would fail to give "no" the
categorical rape-creating effect a consent-based conception might give it. A
counterargument might be that the law needs a bright-line rule -"no means
rape" -to protect against much worse assaults and violations. This may or may
not be a good argument, but it concedes the main point. Someone who says
that sex over a "no" must be called rape for purely prophylactic purposes
admits that the "no" itself does not turn sex into rape.
4. Unconscious, Underage, and Intoxicated Sex
A final difficulty concerns sex with individuals who because of
unconsciousness, age, or intoxication may be deemed "incapable of consent."
In another embarrassment for the picture of rape described here, rape as a
crime against self-possession would not cover some of these cases.
Take unconscious sex. Under prevailing law, sex with an unconscious
person, including someone asleep, is ipso facto rape24 because rape is
understood to be sex without consent, and the unconscious cannot consent.
Rape as a violation of self-possession would not be able to take this position.
If one person knocks another out (whether by violence or drugs) and takes
sexual advantage of the unconscious body, there is clearly sex by force. But in
other cases, the result might not be so clear. Yes, I could say that every act of
sex with an unconscious body is inherently violent, making the force
requirement consistent with prevailing law. But really: is it so clear that all
unconscious sex should be criminal? Among well-settled couples, long used to
sharing the same bed, sexual contact of various kinds with a sleeping person is
common. No one thinks all such touchings are criminal. Doesn't this undermine
the idea of an ipso facto rule against sexual contact with the unconscious?
Sexual penetration of an unconscious stranger (or mere acquaintance) should
certainly be a crime. But it is a crime under traditional assault-and-battery law. 42
illustrate the distinction between saying "no," which can accompany voluntary action, and
being forced into an action by violence.
240. See, e.g., Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, §§ 1, 75(2)(d) (U.K.); State v. Moorman, 358
S.E.2d 502, 505-o6 (N.C. 1987).
241. See, e.g., In re Childers, 310 P.2d 776, 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) ("It is easily understood,
and universally recognized, that a person who is unconscious ... is incapable of exercising
any judgment in any matter whatsoever.").
242. See, e.g., United States v. Bayes, 21o F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2000) ("patently offensive");
People v. Gray, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 684 (Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (any "harmful or offensive"
1440
12 2:13 72 2013
THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION AND THE MYTH OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY
The question is whether every penetration of any unconscious body necessarily
inflicts the profound violation of rape, even though the victim doesn't so
experience it at the time and may not see it that way later.43 It seems to me that
this is plainly not so for some persons in some circumstances. The law needs to
ask instead whether the act was patently offensive, potentially injurious, or
otherwise harmful. Rape law does not ask these questions; the law of battery
does and hence may be better suited to address unconscious sex.
Statutory rape is conventionally said to be rape for the same reason as
unconscious sex: because minors, like the unconscious, are incapable of
consent.2" Rejecting the idea that rape is unconsented-to sex, a conception of
rape based on self-possession could not take this view (and therefore would
not apply to every act of sex with a minor). The truth, however, is that existing
law doesn't really take it either.
If an adult has sex with, say, a seventeen-year-old, the law knows perfectly
well that the latter may in fact have consented: if so, the only charge against the
adult will be statutory rape; if not, the defendant can be charged with "real"
rape as well.4 ' In other words, states distinguish between consenting and
nonconsenting minors, and they criminalize sex between an adult and a
consenting seventeen-year-old not for the illogical reason that a consenting
minor can't consent, but because such sex is deemed immoral and harmful
even though consensual" (unless of course the two are married, in which case
touching (quoting People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571, 622 (1992))), reh'g granted, 264 P.3 d
821 (Cal. 2011).
243. Gardner and Shute, supra note 204, at 3-8, go so far as to describe an idealized sex act with
an unconscious woman, doing no harm to her and not even remembered by her, as the only
form of "pure rape," on the ground that rape victims' actual experiences (of fear, violation,
degradation, pain, and so on) are mere "distracting epiphenomena" that a genuinely
"philosophical" account of rape should ignore. But Gardner and Shute fail to consider
whether every act of sex with an unconscious person is always rape in the first place; they
simply assume it. For a quite different point of view, see TALK To HER (Sony Pictures
Classics 2002), which portrays a comatose ballet dancer whose longtime caretaker has
intercourse with her; she becomes pregnant and wakes from her coma, apparently as the
result of childbirth. I thank Professor Sandra Macpherson for bringing this film to my
attention in connection with this issue.
244. See, e.g., Sy Moskowitz, American Youth in the Workplace: Legal Aberration, Failed Social
Policy, 67 ALB. L. REv. 1071, lo83 (2004) ("Statutory rape statutes conclusively presume that
an underage victim is incapable of giving consent in most states.").
245. See People v. Young, 235 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365-67 (Ct. App. 1987); Carpenter, supra note 175, at
337.
246. See, e.g., People v. Soto, 245 P-3d 410, 418 (Cal. 2011) ("Unlike rape, the wrong punished by
the lewd acts statute is not the violation of a child's sexual autonomy, but of its sexual
innocence.").
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it's sacrosanct). Statutory rape is not an instance of "real" rape; it is a
different and independent crime. Thus seeing "real" rape as a violation of
self-possession (and therefore requiring force) should have no effect on
statutory rape.
As to intoxicated sex, let's distinguish between people who are passed out
or blind-drunk (covered by whatever rules apply to unconscious sex) and
people who, because of impairment or disinhibition, willingly participate in sex
acts to which they would not have consented if sober. And let's further
narrow the latter cases to exclude those in which physical force or threats are
used against the intoxicated person (which would obviously be rape under
any definition). The question, then, is under what circumstances having
otherwise-willing sex with an intoxicated person, who might or would not
have participated but for his or her intoxication, amounts to rape. In such
cases, the decisive question would be how the intoxication came about. If it
came about by force, there would be rape; otherwise, not.
Here the rule I am describing already exists in the case law. In many
jurisdictions, rape will be found in intoxicated sex only if the intoxicant was
not voluntarily consumed, but rather "administered" by the accused." If rape
were sex without consent, this rule would seem dubious." Instead the
doctrine ought to consider only the degree of impairment of judgment and
whether this was visible to the defendant; perhaps the rule should be like
California's, under which it is rape to have sex with anyone who because of
intoxication is no longer exercising "reasonable judgment"19 (a standard
implying that a significant fraction of the state's college-age population may be
guilty of the crime). Requiring in addition that the defendant "administered"
the intoxicant would make little sense if rape were really sex without consent.
But it does make sense if rape requires force.
247. See, e.g., State v. Galati, 365 N.W.2d 575, 578 (S.D. 1985); see also R v. Bree, [2oo8] QB. 131
9 24 (Eng.) (distinguishing between "voluntary" intoxication and "situations in which the
complainant is involuntarily at a disadvantage" as for example "when a drink is 'spiked"').
248. See, e.g., Shlomit Wallerstein, 'A Drunken Consent Is Still Consent'-Or Is It? A Critical
Analysis of the Law on a Drunken Consent to Sex Following Bree, 73 J. CRiM. L. 318, 328 (2009)
(arguing, on the premise that rape is unconsented-to sex, that the "only question is . . .
whether the victim was able to give a valid consent" and that "the question of how" the
victim's inebriation "came about (through ... voluntary conduct of the victim or otherwise)
is irrelevant").
249. See, e.g., People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 324 (Ct. App. 2000).
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CONCLUSION
The right to self-possession implies the freedom not to have another
person forcibly take sexual possession of one's body, which in turn implies the
freedom not to be forced into sexual service. This freedom links rape law
directly to Roe. It explains why rape is not like other assaults without relying on
the myth of sexual autonomy. And it explains why sex-by-deception is not rape.
The right to self-possession would, however, look favorably on rape law's
force requirement and, because it rejects the principle of sexual autonomy, cast
doubt on Lawrence's libertarian leanings. These costs may be too high. If so,
law always has room for myth.
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